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Conclusion
"When the policefail in their duties, and when the courts refuse to provide
remedies, victims of domestic violence are the ones who pay the price."
- JessicaLenahan'
INTRODUCTION

Failed enforcement of an order of protection (OP) obtained by Jessica
Lenahan from Castle Rock, Colorado, authorities led to the June 1999
kidnapping and murder of her three daughters by her estranged husband
Simon, the subject of the OP. 2 In violation of the order, Simon purchased a
gun and kidnapped the children from their mother's front lawn. 3 Despite
1. Jessica Lenahan, Testimony Before the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights

(Oct.

22,

2008),

available

at

http://www.chrgj.org/events/docs/

Jessica%20Testimony%20FINAL%20for%/20posting.pdff.
2. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales (Castle Rock IV), 545 U.S. 748, 748 (2005).
3. Id. at 753-54. I set aside the enforcement issues surrounding the purchase of a
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Jessica's repeated pleas for help, the police never attempted to enforce the
OP, which contained statutorily created language that mandated Simon's
arrest in the event of a violation.4 Instead, the emergency dispatcher
criticized her for reporting the violation.5 When Jessica went to the police
station to file a complaint in person, the officer who took down the incident
report "made no reasonable effort to enforce the [OP] or locate the three
children and instead, he went to dinner." 6 After ten hours, Simon drove his
truck, containing the bodies of the three girls, to the police station and
engaged in a shoot-out with police during which he was killed by police.
Jessica's daughters were found dead in Simon's truck.
Jessica sued the town of Castle Rock and in 2005, after years of
litigation, the United States Supreme Court in Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales denied Jessica's claims to a federal remedy.9 The majority
opinion, written by Justice Antonin Scalia, largely abrogated government's
responsibility for harm suffered by victims of domestic violence due to the
lack of enforcement of OPs against private actors under the United States
Constitution. 0 The Castle Rock decision effectively precluded any right to
recovery under federal law for harms resulting from failed OPs, rejecting
Jessica's procedural and substantive due process arguments and rearticulating the Court's long-standing reluctance to treat the Fourteenth
Amendment as "a font of tort law.""
gun in violation of the order because my focus in this article will be on the response of
municipal police, not the failures of federal and state firearms licensing procedures.
4. Id. at 751-53.
5. See Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report
No. 80/11, 30 (2011) ("During the call, the dispatcher asked Jessica Lenahan to call
back on a non-emergency line and scolded her stating that it was 'a little ridiculous
making us freak out and thinking the kids are gone."').
6. Castle Rock IV, 545 U.S. at 754.
7. Id.
8. Id. The police never determined which bullets killed the girls, but it is believed

that Simon shot each of them in the head. Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11,

185.

9. D. KELLY WEISBERG, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LEGAL AND SOCIAL REALITY 267
(2012) ("In a sharp dissent in Castle Rock, Justice Stevens (joined by Justice Ginsburg)
charged that the majority failed to take seriously (1) the purpose and nature of
restraining orders, and (2) authority from other states recognizing that mandatory arrest
statutes and restraining orders create an individual right to police action. . . . According

to the dissent, mandatory arrest statutes 'undeniably create an entitlement to police

enforcement of restraining orders' because, under the statute, the police were required
to provide enforcement; they lacked the discretion to do nothing (emphasis in the
original). Finally, the dissent noted that cases have found 'property' interests in other
state benefits and services (welfare benefits, disability benefits, etc.) and, therefore,
reasoned that police enforcement of a restraining order is a government service that is
'no less concrete."' (citations omitted)).
10. See Castle Rock IV, 545 U.S. at 751-54.
11. Id. at 768 (citations omitted). For a full discussion of the Castle Rock case, see
infra Part II.
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Having exhausted all avenues for a domestic remedy, but persisting
despite the Supreme Court's rejection, Jessica and her advocates filed a
complaint against the government of the United States before the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights (Commission), alleging
violations of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.12
During the pendency of the litigation, Jessica changed her surname from
Gonzales to Lenahan.13 In the summer of 2011 the Commission issued a
groundbreaking report, Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States,
finding that the United States government violated the international nationstatel 4 responsibility standard of "due diligence" by failing to effectively
enforce orders of protection against perpetrators of domestic violence. 5
In Lenahan, the Commission responded to Justice Scalia's due process
analysis in Castle Rock, but also articulated additional grounds for relief,
finding that the United States' failure to act with due diligence violated the
"obligation not to discriminate and to provide for equal protection before
the law under Article II of the American Declaration."1 6 The Commission
made seven recommendations in total: (1) undertake an investigation into
the death of Ms. Lenahan's children; (2) conduct an examination of the
systemic failures that led to the failed enforcement of Ms. Lenahan's
protective order; (3) offer full reparations; (4) adopt legislation making
enforcement of protective orders mandatory; (5) adopt legislation including
protections for children in the context of domestic violence; (6) continue to
adopt policies to restructure victim stereotypes and eradicate discriminatory
socio-cultural patterns including training and prevention programs for law
enforcement; and (7) design protocols at the federal and state levels to
more effectively investigate reports of missing children within the context
of violations of OPs.17 By setting aside the rejection of the due process
arguments in Castle Rock and pivoting toward the United States'
obligations under due diligence and equal protection standards, the
Lenahan report reinvigorated domestic violence scholars and victim

12. See Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11, $T 1-2.
13. Id. T 1.

14. The term "nation-state" here refers to sovereign governments in the
international order. The term "state" refers to one of the several states of the United
States of America.
15. Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11, 5 ("The [United States] failed to act
with due diligence to protect Jessica Lenahan and Leslie, Katheryn and Rebecca
Gonzales from domestic violence, which violated the [United States'] obligation not to
discriminate and to provide for equal protection before the law under Article II of the
American Declaration."). The Commission also held that the United States violated the
children's right to life under Article I of the American Declaration and that the United
States violated Jessica's right to judicial protection. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. 215.
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advocates to pursue innovative legal theories under which to hold
accountable the institutions responsible for failed OPs.
This article conceives of new applications of the established common
law construct of municipal tort liability, infused with the international
government liability standard of "due diligence," to bring about more
Municipal tort liability, which has
effective enforcement of OPs.
developed in state courts over the last fifty years,18 has yielded positive
results for victims of failed OPs and, more importantly, has resulted in
systemic change in OP enforcement policy and practice. 9 Although
Jessica's attorneys asserted a constitutional tort liability argument in the
early stages of the litigation under Section 1983 of the United States Code,
no common law municipal tort theory was ever advanced on her behalf; as
such, the argument that may have provided the best avenue for recovery
was never heard. 2 0 This article addresses the potential of domestic
municipal tort litigation as an effective strategy to incentivize police to
create, adopt, and implement OP enforcement policies consistent with the
overarching compliance mandate set forth in Lenahan.
Part I articulates two theoretical assumptions about international law
compliance and the efficacy of grassroots norm-creation. Part II briefly
describes the domestic litigation preceding Lenahan and the bases for the
United States' rejection of the duty to properly enforce OPs. Part III of the
Article explains the Commission's findings and discusses the reasons why
the Commission's legislative reform mandate may not be the most effective
route to achieving the goal of adequate enforcement of OPs. Part IV
provides an analysis of the international nation-state liability standard of
"due diligence" as applied by the Commission in Lenahan. Finally, Part V
discusses the development of domestic municipal tort liability, its
This Article uses New York State
successes, and its limitations.
jurisprudence to illustrate the common features of the international "due
diligence" and domestic municipal tort liability frameworks. Examining
the commonalities, this Article suggests a litigation strategy that may shift
domestic courts away from a victim-focused liability assessment and
toward a theory centered on the due diligence themes of foreseeability and
prevention, thus "domesticating" 2 1 the principles articulated in Lenahan in
18. See generally Licia A. Esposito Eaton, Annotation, Liability of Municipality or
Other Governmental Unit for Failure to Provide Police Protectionfrom Crime, 90

A.L.R. 5th 273, §§ 4-6, 8-10 (2001).
19. See infra Part V.

20. Gonzalez v. City of Castle Rock (Castle Rock 1), No. Civ.A.00 D 1285, 2001
WL 35973820, at *5 (D. Colo. Jan. 23, 2001) ("The City of Castle Rock seeks
dismissal of the claims against it on the ground that Plaintiff cannot establish municipal
liability. Because I find that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, I will not address these arguments.").
21. "Domesticating" international law is a term of art that refers to the process of
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the absence of formal compliance.
I. THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING COMPLIANCE AND
NORMATIVE INCENTIVES

A. The United States Government Will Not Voluntarily or Proactively
Comply with the Commission's Recommendations

This Article assumes that the Lenahan decision is a legitimate
articulation of the United States' violation of the international human rights
due diligence obligation to protect women 2 2 from domestic violence
committed by non-state actors, but that despite its legitimacy, the decision
will not inspire the United States government to come into compliance with
international law. This assumption necessarily implicates questions about
whether the United States is obligated to comply with the expressions of
applicable international law standards. Compliance incentives encouraging
or discouraging nation-states to obey international law have generated a
wealth of scholarship and prominent legal scholars throughout history have
provided a range of compliance theories. 2 3 This Article only briefly
summarizes the points relevant to the unique compliance problem faced by
advocates seeking to domesticate the Lenahan ruling due to its basis in
international human rights law.
Historically, international law scholars gathered around a unifying theory
of compliance based on the idea that "international rules are rarely
enforced, but usually obeyed." 24 This maxim centers on a nation-state's
incorporating international law into domestic law. One of the earliest uses of the term
to describe this process specifically with regard to international human rights law is in
an article identifying the "potentially binding effect of international human rights
norms as customary international law."
Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and
InternationalJudicial Protection of Individual Rights: A Comparative Legal Process
Analysis and ProposedSynthesis, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 815-16 (1990).

22. The Commission focused on the United States' obligation to protect women

from domestic violence, under international laws guaranteeing rights to life, equality,
non-discrimination, and equal protection. Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11,
1 107-21. In the Commission's view, domestic violence is an "extreme form of
discrimination." Id. 114.
23. See generally Harold Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, 106
YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) [hereinafter Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?]
(containing an historical analysis of myriad theories of international law compliance
through the late 20th century); ABRAM H. CHAYES & ANTONIA CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995)

(articulating the "managerial model" of. compliance, which relies primarily on "a
cooperative, problem-solving approach"); THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995) (articulating the "fairness approach"

involving legitimacy and distributive justice).
24. See Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, supra note 23, at 2603
(citing prominent international law scholar and critic, HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS
AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 249-52 (2d ed. 1954) ("[T]o

deny that international law exists as a system of binding legal rules flies in the face of
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legal or moral obligation to obey international law by consent to treaty
25
obligations (pacta sunt servanda) or customary law (opiniojuris).
In an
era of increasing tension between human rights compliance and national
security post-September 11,26 contemporary international law scholars are
engaged in a theoretical struggle that challenges the traditional maxim of
compliance.
Some have built on established theories to describe
international law compliance as a "transnational process" of interpreting
and internalizing global norms into domestic law, which "leads to
reconstruction of national interests." 27 This viewpoint subsumes national
interests within the more sophisticated process of global norm
internalization.
Countervailing views that nation-states comply out of rational selfinterest, placing national interests over any moral or norm-based obligation,
frst to
are the subject of increased debate and scrutiny. 28 Recent efforts
reconcile this modern tension have focused on the "link between national

all the evidence[.]")); see also LouIs HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979)
("[A]lmost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all
of their obligations almost all of the time.").
25. Customary international law is defined as a "general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 102(2) (1987).
26. See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law,
and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 675, 746-54

(2004) (discussing the limitations of the law of armed conflict in constraining the war
on terror and suggesting that international human rights frameworks may provide
human rights advocates with tools to effect policy discourse and construct litigation
strategy to hold the United States accountable for human rights abuses in the name of

the war on terror); Catherine Powell, Lifting Our Veil of Ignorance: Culture,
Constitutionalism and Women's Human Rights in Post-September 11 America, 57

L.J. 331 (2005) (discussing the United States' failure to ratify the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), an international human rights instrument respecting the rights of women).
HASTINGS

27. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note 23, at 2659; see
also Arturo J. Carrillo, Bringing International Law Home: The Innovative Role of
Human Rights Clinics in the TransnationalLegal Process, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 527 (2004); Harold Hongju Koh, Jefferson Memorial Lecture: Transnational
Legal Process After September 11th, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 337 (2004).
28. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Do States Have a Moral Obligation to Obey
InternationalLaw?, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1901, 1919 (2002-2003); see also JACK L.

& ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (presenting
a more sophisticated and detailed discussion of the rational choice theory applied to
international law compliance); ANDREW T. GUZMAN, How INTERNATIONAL LAW
WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 71-118 (2008) (providing an in-depth discussion
of how reputation affects state behavior). But see MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL
INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 34-127 (1996) (presenting empirical evidence
of the influence of international norms and institutions over state behavior); Ryan
GOLDSMITH

Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L.

REv. 1748, 1762-80 (2003) (presenting empirical evidence that international norms
induce states to imitate one another); David Sloss, Do InternationalNorms Influence
State Behavior?, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 159 (2006) (reviewing and critiquing
Goldsmith & Posner from a norms-based perspective).
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self-interest and fidelity to norms as being essentially the same dynamic
underlying normative rationality and normative morality."2 9 This latter
framework appears to hold the most promise for explaining and suggesting
advocacy strategies to address the United States' lack of compliance with
international human rights norms like those expressed in Lenahan.
Human rights law is a unique subset of international law concerned with
the protection of the rights of individual persons rather than the
interrelationship of nation-states and therefore presents unique compliance
challenges. After World War II, international human rights law expanded
the obligations of nation-states and their leaders to protect individuals from
human rights abuses.30 But the robust expansion of rights and duties did
not provide a corresponding enforcement mechanism. Scholars have
identified human rights as "an area of international law in which countries
have little incentive to police noncompliance with treaties or norms"
because "the major engines of compliance that exist in other areas of
international law are for the most part absent."3' For this reason, current
compliance models cannot explain the reasons why nation-states either
adhere to or ignore international human rights obligations.
The human rights obligation to prevent and punish domestic violence
falls within this category of compliance anomalies. Within the existing
compliance models, one might argue that there exists a rational self-interest
for the United States to comply with such an obligation, for example,
reducing the public health and economic costs imposed by domestic
violence.32 And as will be discussed herein, there are certainly moral and
legal reasons why the United States should comply with applicable
international human rights law. Recent attempts to describe compliance
with decisions in the Inter-American system focus on nation-state actions
in response to compliance orders issued from the Inter-American Court
29. Jens David Ohlin, Nash Equilibrium and InternationalLaw, 96 CORNELL L.
REV. 869, 899 (2011).
30. See generally SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 333-82
(2d ed. 2012) (providing a brief history of the evolution of international human rights
law, nation-state responsibility for injury to foreign nationals, and global human rights
instruments).
31. Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE
L.J. 1935, 1938 (2002).
32. See, e.g., NAT'L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2003), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/
pdf/IPVBook-a.pdf ("The costs of intimate partner rape, physical assault, and stalking
exceed $5.8 billion each year, nearly $4.1 billion of which is for direct medical and
mental health care services."); see also Mary Ellsberg et al., Intimate Partner Violence
and Women's Physical and Mental Health in the WHO Multi-country Study on
Women's Health and Domestic Violence: An ObservationalStudy, 371 LANCET 1165,
1165-72 (2008) (describing an empirical medical study finding that "intimate partner
violence is associated with serious public-health consequences").
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demanding specific types of victim reparations.3 3 Because the Commission
issued the Lenahan decision and because the Commission lacks the
authority to issue compliance orders, this compliance framework is
inapplicable.
Non-compliance is the norm for the United States when it comes to
unfavorable opinions from the Inter-American system. The federal
government has a history of ignoring Commission decisions, "arguing that
it is not bound to comply with the decisions of such international human
rights bodies," which indicates that none of the traditional compliance
incentives are appealing to the United States government.34 This pattern of
non-compliance persisted after the Commission's decision in Lenahan;
nearly a year has passed and the United States has yet to comply with any
of the Commission's recommendations.
This Article acknowledges that the United States is not likely to comply
and focuses instead on ways in which domestic violence victims and their
advocates can change police OP enforcement policy and practice through
the process of domesticating the decision, focusing on the "incorporation of
thematic elements of the decision into legislation or case law" in order to
influence government actors to act in a manner consistent, if not compliant,
As M. Cherif Bassiouni recently
with the Lenahan recommendations.
suggested, "[t]he future of [international human rights law regimes] is their
absorption into national legal systems whose enforcement mechanisms are
likely to have a far more effective impact on compliance than any assisting
or prospective international set of mechanisms." 36 While the traditional
debate over state compliance focuses on top-down strategies, the purpose
of this Article is to offer pragmatic suggestions for influencing state OP
enforcement policy and practice to conform to international human rights
law from the ground up.
B. GrassrootsNorm EntrepreneurshipCan Incentivize Police to Create
andAdhere to Police Policies That Comply with the Values Expressedby
the Commission in the Absence ofFormalFederalCompliance
This Article is also premised on an assumption that litigation and other
33. David Baluarte, Strategizing for Compliance, AM. U.

INT'L

L. REv.

(forthcoming) (on file with author).

34. Caroline Bettinger-Lopez, Human Rights at Home: Domestic Violence as a
Human Rights Violation, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 19, 49 (2008) (citing the

United States' rejection of the IACHR's conclusions and recommendations in Mary &
Carrie Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02,
OEA/Serv.L./V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1, T 150 (2002)).
35. Id. at 50.
36. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Future of Human Rights in the Age of Globalization,

40 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 22, 28-29 (2011) ("Thus, the center of gravity of human
rights has, as it should, moved from internationalization to nationalization. . . .").
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grassroots norm-shifting strategies can influence the policy and practice of
institutions responsible for the enforcement of OPs. "Norms are the
language a society speaks, the embodiment of its values and collective
desires, the secure guide in the uncertain lands we all traverse, the common
practices that hold human groups together." 3 7 "Norms do not appear out of
thin air; they are actively built by agents having strong notions about
appropriate or desirable behavior in their community." 38 They are the most
powerful yet analytically elusive guideposts of human behavior. This
Article is a contribution to the larger project of determining how customary
international human rights law might influence domestic OP enforcement
norms in the absence of traditional or formal government compliance. 39 In
the case of OP enforcement, the most interesting norms to examine are
those that encourage or discourage police compliance with official or
unofficial policies guiding enforcement.
Using the Lenahan decision to "alert people to the existence of a shared
complaint," human rights advocates could function as "norm
entrepreneurs" by: "(a) signaling their own commitment to change, (b)
creating coalitions, (c) making defiance of the norms [of non-compliance]
seem or be less costly, and (d) making compliance with new norms seem or
be more beneficial."4 0 Municipal tort litigation informed by principles of
international human rights law may be able to set a precedent that more
closely mirrors the Lenahan recommendations, resulting in the creation and
implementation of more responsive police practices, which in turn may
influence the norms guiding police behavior. As described by Sally Engle
Merry, "This process of re-appropriation may introduce unfamiliar
categories of self and personhood, including a redefinition of women's
rights to safety, but it is the result of local agents mobilizing national and
global law in the face of local resistance rather than a global imposition of
This concept of non-governmental norm
a new moral order." 41
37. CHRISTINA BICCHIERi, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY: THE NATURE
DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL NORMS, at ix (2006).

AND

38. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and
PoliticalChange, 51 INT'L ORG. 887, 896 (1998).

39. The domestication of international human rights law in the United States is an
increasingly popular subject of inquiry. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS INTHE UNITED
STATES: BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM (Shareen Hertal & Kathryn Libel eds., 2011)
(examining how international human rights norms influence domestic policy);
BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME (Cynthia Soohoo et al. eds., 2007) (one of the first
major works on this subject); Cynthia Soohoo & Suzanne Stolz, Bringing Theories of
Human Rights Change Home, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 459 (2008) (examining the
internalization of international human rights norms domestically).
40. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 929
(1996) (defining norm entrepreneurs as "people interested in changing social norms").
41. Sally Engle Merry, Women, Violence and Human Rights, in WOMEN, GENDER
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 83, 89 (Marjorie Agosin ed., 2001).
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entrepreneurship influencing government policy is not untested. Legal
scholars have identified a number of areas where norm entrepreneurship
has successfully influenced the United States to conform to international
law including the campaign to ban land mines4 2 and the treatment of
detainees in Guantanamo Bay,4 3 to name a few. Police practices and
policies in the United States are similarly not immune.4 4
Although the role of norm entrepreneurship in demanding government
accountability for domestic violence deserves its own detailed analysis, the
scope of this Article does not afford a thorough examination. Rather, this
Article notes that norm entrepreneurship using the tools of education,
litigation, and legislation has historically yielded successful, policychanging movements with regard to OP enforcement.4 6 These grassroots
movements were based on models that reject "the classical administrative
assumption that organizational change is most effectively imposed from the
top down, with little or no participation by those most affected by the

change." 4 7
Because victim advocates have a limited pool of resources with which to
affect government policy and practice, it is worthwhile to engage in a study
of what types of grassroots activities are most likely to be effective in
capitalizing off of the Lenahan decision to bring about better protections
42. Lesley Wexler, The International Deployment of Shame, Second Best
Responses, and Norm Entrepreneurship: The Campaign to Ban Landmines and the
Landmine Ban Treaty, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 561 (2003).
43. Catherine Powell, The Role of TransnationalNorm Entrepreneurs in the U.S.
"War on Terrorism," 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 47 (2004).

44. In her memoir, civil rights attorney Connie Rice details her successful career
suing the Los Angeles Police Department for its treatment of alleged criminals in its
custody and on the streets. Through litigation and other norm-shifting strategies, she
dramatically improved its policies and practices, creating a more humane police force.
See generally CONNIE RICE, POWER CONCEDES NOTHING (2012).
45. See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider et al., Implementing the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights' Domestic-Violence Ruling, 46 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.

113 (2012) (providing an overview of some of the possible avenues for advocacy and
norm entrepreneurship using the Lenahan decision, including municipal tort litigation).
46. In the late 1980s, the New York State police engaged in a statewide police
policy and training project to encourage the adoption of pro-arrest policies in cases
involving domestic violence. Lisa Frisch & Joseph M. Caruso, The Criminalization of
Woman Battering: Planned Change Experiences in New York State, in HELPING

102, 124-25 (Albert R. Roberts
ed., 1996). These "planned change experiences" were structured using public policy
theorists Robert T. Nakamura and Frank Smallwood's "political interaction model" of
policymaking. Id. at 121. The model as applied to police practices involving domestic
violence stresses the importance of focusing on the effect of policy on police practice in
determining the most effective advocacy strategies to encourage policy
BATTERED WOMEN: NEW PERSPECTIVES AND REMEDIES

implementation.

See id.

("Traditional hierarchical views assume that the written

policy is the ultimate goal for change and thus ignore the need to transform policy
statements into predictable police practice.").
47. Id. (citing ROBERT T. NAKAMURA & FRANK SMALLWOOD, THE POLITICS OF
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 27 (1980)).
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for victims of domestic violence through the effective enforcement of OPs.
This Article examines the potential of one such avenue: municipal tort
litigation.
II. CAPPING THE FONT OF FEDERAL TORT LAW: CASTLE ROCK IN BRIEF
The Supreme Court's analysis of federal tort law in Castle Rock provides
the necessary context to engage in an informed exploration of the potential
impact of the Commission's ruling in Lenahan. Justice Scalia's opinion in
Castle Rock analogized OP enforcement cases with the United States
Supreme Court's previous ruling in DeShaney v. Winnebago, in which the
Court declined to identify a state duty to protect children from abuse
inflicted by private individuals. 48 The case was brought by a mother whose
son was fatally abused by his father; she sued social workers and local
officials who were aware of the abuse and did not take actions to prevent
it.49 The Court took a definitive stand against extending due process
protections to the actions of non-state actors, stating, "[i]ts purpose was to
protect people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them
from each other."50 The limiting effect of the unfavorable ruling in
DeShaney reduced potential avenues for state accountability for domestic
violence to four discrete categories: (1) victims in state custody or victims
harmed due to state-created danger; (2) violations of procedural due
process; (3) equal protection violations; or (4) state tort liability. 5 ' Castle
Rock eliminated the due process pathway. 52
In keeping with the DeShaney precedent, the decision in Castle Rock
erred on the side of limiting state liability rather than engaging in a process
of defining the contours of limited state liability in the specific context of
domestic violence. Despite Colorado's existing mandatory arrest statute
requiring the arrest of an individual who police had probable cause to
believe was in violation of an OP, and despite that language being printed
in the OP itself, Justice Scalia found that since the police were free to
exercise their discretion in these cases, the law was not a mandatory
48. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202
(1989) (holding that, absent a special relationship, police inaction does not violate a
victim's substantive due process rights).
49. Id. at 191.

50. Id. at 196.
51. WEISBERG, supra note 9, at 266; see also G. Kristian Miccio, With All Due
Deliberate Care: Using InternationalLaw and the Federal Violence Against Women
Act to Locate the Contours of State Responsibilityfor Violence Against Mothers in the
Age of DeShaney, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 641, 645 (1997) [hereinafter Miccio,
DeliberateCare] (analyzing state responsibility for domestic violence through the lens
of DeShaney, international law, and the legislative history of the Violence Against
Women Act).
52. Castle Rock IV, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005).
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function of police power. 53 The main thrust of Scalia's argument in Castle
Rock was that the scope of police duty under Colorado's mandatory arrest
statute was unclear in cases where the offender was not present to be
arrested and that other provisions giving victims the ability to seek redress
in the courts for contempt of the order were a much clearer entitlement.5 4
However, this is a limited view of the type of harm perpetrated in domestic
violence that fails to consider the legislative intent underlying state
mandatory arrest statutes. 5 It assumes that the harm is only present if the
aggressor is in the victim's presence and that the state only has an interest
in preventing immediate physical harm to the victim.
These assumptions are inapposite in cases involving psychological or
emotional abuse, which the abuser may inflict remotely. And when the
abuser kidnaps the children and holds them hostage in violation of the
court's order, as was the case in Castle Rock/Lenahan, these assumptions
ignore the terror and fear suffered by victims when their abusers secret
their children to unknown parts in violation of the OP or custody agreement
on record. Also, these assumptions inappropriately shift the burden of
enforcement of the order off of law enforcement and onto the victim. They
imply that the appropriate response to violations of OPs is not the state
taking proactive measures to locate and arrest the abuser, securing the
victim's safety; rather, it is the victim's responsibility to go to the court and
file a contempt action, potentially aggravating the abuser and inflaming the
situation that was already so dangerous that an OP had to be issued in the
first instance.
Notably, Scalia distinguished federal claims from potential state court
actions: "[this ruling] does not mean States are powerless to provide

53. Id. at 782-84. A number of states have enacted mandatory arrest statutes,
including New York. See NEAL MILLER, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A REVIEW OF STATE
LEGISLATION DEFINING POLICE AND PROSECUTION DUTIES AND POWERS 28 n.86 (2004),

available at http://www.ilj.org/publications/docs/Domestic Violence Legislation.pdf
(listing mandatory arrest statutes from Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, the
District of Columbia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin, and Missouri).
54. Castle Rock IV, 545 U.S. at 762-66.
55. In a controversial essay, Roger Pilon of the Cato Institute noted Justice Scalia's
uncharacteristic disregard for the legislative history in the Colorado mandatory arrest
statute. Roger Pilon, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales: Executive Indifference,
Judicial Complicity, in 2004-2005 CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 101, 116 (2005)
("[The legislative history] makes it unmistakably clear that in this area involving
domestic violence, Colorado, like a number of other states in recent years, meant
precisely to remove virtually all law enforcement discretion, especially given the welldocumented
evidence that absent such mandatory requirements, police
underenforcement tended to be the rule, often with tragic results, which is just what
happened here. Yet Scalia dismisses the text, uncharacteristically, and the legislative
history too, which he is ordinarily more inclined to do.").
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In fact, as will be
victims with personally enforceable remedies."5
discussed herein, the font of tort law capped by the federal government
may actually result in a wellspring of municipal tort actions among the
several states. Municipal tort liability does exactly what the Castle Rock
Court declined to do under federal law, that is, "create a system by which
police departments are generally held financially accountable for crimes
However, state court
that better policing might have prevented."57
litigation was not the immediate reaction to the Castle Rock case.
Because orders of protection and their enforcement arise out of statutory
law, advocates turned their attention to the state and federal legislatures in
the years that followed the Castle Rock decision. In the seven years since
the opinion, legislative efforts have been disappointing. The lack of
progress was noted by United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women Rashida Manjoo in her findings following a 2011 mission
to the United States.5 9 The next section addresses some of the legislative
efforts to strengthen OP enforcement at the federal and state levels and why
they have fallen short of the goal of influencing actual police practice and
policies regarding OP enforcement.
III. THE COMMISSION'S MANDATE AND WHY LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS ARE
OFTEN INADEQUATE

The Commission's legislative recommendations reflect several mistaken
assumptions: (1) that the federal and state legislatures are the primary or
preferable source of expressive domestic law for treaty obligations and
human rights values to which the Commission seeks to hold the United
States accountable and (2) that federal and state legislative changes are the

56. Castle Rock IV, 545 U.S. at 768.
57. Id. at 769-70. But see Julie Goldscheid, Rethinking Civil Rights and Gender
Violence, 13 GEO. J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Goldscheid,

Rethinking Civil Rights] (articulating an argument for the potential effectiveness of
federal civil rights approaches to law enforcement accountability post-Lenahan).
58. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Disappointed with

Supreme Court Ruling on Domestic Violence Orders of Protection (June 27, 2005),

available at http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/aclu-disappointed-supreme-courtruling-domestic-violence-orders-protection (calling for state legislatures to create
statutes that hold law enforcement liable for failing to enforce protective orders);

Statement of Fernando Laguarda, Counsel of Record, The National Network to End

Domestic Violence, Regarding Town of Castle Rock v. Jessica Gonzales (June 27,
2005),

available

at

http://www.ncdsv.org/images/

StatementofFernandoLaguardareTownCastleRock.pdf (imploring state and federal
lawmakers to pass legislation to prevent future similar tragedies from occurring).
59. "[E]ven where local and state police are grossly negligent in their duties to
protect women's right to physical security, and even where they fail to respond to an
urgent call, there is no federal level constitutional or statutory remedy." Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Mission to the United States of America,

71, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/26/Add.5 (June 6, 2011).
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best way to influence the actions of the individuals responsible for
guaranteeing these rights and fulfilling these obligations-police and other
state law enforcement actors. These assumptions are not uncommon, but
they are mistaken if the goal of the Commission is to bring the OP
enforcement practices of municipal police forces in compliance with
international law.60
Attempts to legislate more effective enforcement of OPs may not
succeed in achieving this result for several reasons, which are discussed in
the next sections. "In the final analysis, the ability of the law to temper or
even eradicate violence is compromised continuously by the contradictions
between law's epistemological boundaries and cultural attitudes buffeted
by social and economic arrangements." 6 1 These contradictions are evident
in the formulation of local policies adopted under legislative imperative.
A. Implicit Obstacles to Legislating Compliance with InternationalLaw
The federalist structure of the United States legal system creates unique
challenges for federal legislative implementation of any international
human rights norm that implicates state executive functions. Unlike most
other constitutional democracies within the Inter-American system, the
United States is a federalist nation-state, comprised of the several states and
their political subdivisions. Although the power to bind the United States
to treaty obligations is reserved to the federal government, absent federal
implementing legislation, 62 the states are not obligated to subordinate the
values underlying any conflicting state laws to those of the federal
government for most treaty obligations.63 However, state and local
60. See Judith Resnick, Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent
Dialogues, and Federalism'sMultiple Ports ofEntry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1624 (2006)

("But a Congress (internationalist or sovereigntist), appreciative of the prerogatives of
state courts, ought not to advise state judges on how they should approach
lawmaking."); cf Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004) ("[A] decision to
create a private right of action is one better left to legislative judgment in the great
majority of cases.. .. While the absence of congressional action addressing private
rights of action under an international norm is more equivocal than its failure to provide
such a right when it creates a statute, the possible collateral consequences of making
international rules privately actionable argue for judicial caution.").
61. Penelope E. Andrews, Violence Against Women in South Africa: The Role of
Culture and the Limitations of the Law, 8 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 425, 456

(1998).
62. Unless a treaty is deemed to be "self-executing," it requires federal legislative
action to become binding law. See MURPHY, supra note 30, at 254 ("A self-executing
treaty is capable of being directly applied as part of the internal law in the United States
immediately upon entry into force of the agreement.

. .

. Non-self executing treaties,

however, require legislation or some other source of U.S. law to implement them in the
United States.").
63. The consular notice provisions of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (VCCR), to which the United States is a party, recently thrust the tensions
between federal and state law in the United States into the international spotlight. In
2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found the United States to be in violation
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governments may choose to comply with human rights declarations and
rulings, independent of whether or not the federal government has ratified
the instruments or accepted the jurisdiction of the international tribunal.64
challenge of navigating the
In addition to the procedural
compartmentalization of nation-state responsibility among federal, state,
and local governments, state laws respecting OPs implicate larger
substantive law and policy concerns including the extension of the right of
protection to LGBT victimS65 and property rights. 66 Because those are
of the provision requiring nation-states to inform foreign nationals charged with crimes
in the United States of their right to speak with a consular official from their home
country. See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United
States), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 13-14 (Mar. 31). Subsequently, the United States Supreme
Court held that absent federal legislation implementing the ruling of the ICJ, the laws
of the several states applied and therefore, if state law procedures for pleading
violations of the VCCR were not followed, claims under it were barred. See Medellin
v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 510 (2008) ("If ICJ judgments were instead regarded as
automatically enforceable domestic law, they would be immediately and directly
binding on state and federal courts pursuant to the Supremacy Clause."). To preserve
the rights of detained foreign nationals while the states determined their obligations in
light of the Supreme Court ruling, the ICJ issued a stay of all executions of foreign
nationals on death row in any state in the United States who had not been informed of
their rights under the VCCR. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mexico v. United States), Provisional Measures, 2003 I.C.J. 77 para. 59 (Feb. 5).
Predictably, the State of Texas refused to cooperate despite a personal letter to the
state's Governor, Rick Perry, from the Republican Presidential administration of Texan
George W. Bush, drafted by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Attorney General
Michael Mukasey, urging Governor Perry to respect the ICJ ruling demanding the stay.
The Governor's spokesman responded unequivocally: "The world court has no
standing in Texas and Texas is not bound by a ruling or edict from a foreign court ....
It is easy to get caught up in discussions of international law and justice and treaties."
Allan Turner & Rosanna Ruiz, Execution of Houston Girls' Killer Still on Track for
Aug. 5, HousTON CHRON. (July 16, 2008), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-

(internal
texas/article/Execution-of-Houston-girls-killer-still-on-track- 1788473.php
quotation marks omitted). State rejection of federal treaty obligations is a major
concern that is outside the scope of this Article. It is noted here to illustrate the
complexity of the compliance question and as a warning to any activists or advocates
attempting to influence state policies. Absent a self-executing treaty obligation, state
governments in the United States are not bound by international law. Oona Hathaway
et al., InternationalLaw at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts, 37 YALE J. INT'L
L. 51, 91-101 (2012) (distinguishing between self-executing treaties, private rights, and
private rights of action under international law and providing a history of the
distinction as it relates to claims in domestic courts for violations of international law);
see also GUZMAN, supra note 28, at 3-6 (for additional discussion of the Medellin
decision and the issues it raises for compliance).
64. See generally UNIV. OF VA., VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE STATE'S OBLIGATION TO PROTECT 13-14 (2011), available at
http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/hr/vaw.pdf.
65. Some state legislatures, like in New York, have broadened the definition of the
category of persons against whom an order of protection may be sought, expanding the
reach to the state's definition of "intimate partner." The definition includes same-sex
partners, unmarried dating teens, ex-spouses, and other individuals not previously
subject to the jurisdiction of orders of protection. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.11
(McKinney 2012). Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Texas have similarly broad
definitions of intimate partners. See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 209A, § 1 (2007); 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 6102 (2001); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.0021(b) (West 2005); see also
Jennifer Cranstoun et al., What's an Intimate Relationship, Anyway? ExpandingAccess
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issues largely reserved to the states and because states vary widely on the
range of protections afforded within the constraints of state law, it is
unlikely that federal legislative action mandating policies for OP
enforcement (other than monetary incentiveS67 and federal firearms laws)
will survive a judicial challenge.6 8 As such, due to the complex interplay
between the federal government and that of its several states, absent
congressional action preempting this particular function of law
enforcement, the federal government is constrained in its ability to adopt
legislation directly impacting OP enforcement. 6 9
B. FederalLegislation and FailedStatutory Causes ofAction
The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), passed by Congress in
1994, was a landmark piece of legislation that arguably demonstrated the
government's acceptance of "an affirmative duty to prevent domestic
violence." 70 The law originally provided for a federal civil rights cause of
action for domestic violence. Six years later, in a case involving the rape
of a Virginia Tech college student by two other male students, the Supreme
Court extinguished VAWA's civil rights remedy declaring it
unconstitutional because, in the Court's opinion, neither the Commerce
Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment state action and enforcement
to the New York State Family Courtsfor Civil Orders of Protection, 29 PACE L. REV.
455, 463-68 (2009) (comparing New York's statutory scheme with several other states'
laws).
66. Orders of protection may require that the abuser vacate the family residence,
regardless of their ownership interest in the property. See Araya v. Keleta, 31 A.3d 78,
79 (D.C. 2011); V.C. v. H.C., 257 A.D.2d 27, 33 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
67. These types of incentives can be found in federal legislation such as the
Violence Against Women Act and the Victims of Crimes Act. Violence Against
Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14031 (2012) (creating a grant program for states dedicated to
the enforcement of protective orders); Victims of Crimes Act, 42 U.S.C. § 10603a
(2012) (establishing a grant program for states that set up a child abuse task force
according to federal requirements).
68. "Contrary to our constitutional system, the international human rights systemincluding political and civil rights-imposes positive as well as negative state
responsibilities. Under our federal constitutional system, claims that the state is
responsible for failing to protect, prevent or punish have no force. . . . While it is
undeniably progress that the international system has finally recognized gender
violence as a human rights matter, the remedies are primarily state-centric. This raises,
in turn, the limitations and dangers of transferring reliance for protection to, and,
thereby, enhancing, the policing power of the state." NANCY K. D. LEMON, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE LAW 1343-45 (2009).
69. Cf Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilitiesfor
Incorporationof Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 245, 250
(2001) ("[D]ialogue among various levels of government is critical to meaningful
implementation of international human rights law in the United States.").
70. See Miccio, Deliberate Care, supra note 51, at 675, 669-77 (providing an
analysis of the development and passage of the Violence Against Women Act, the
language of the Act, and the legislative intent as an acceptance of the duty to prevent
domestic violence against women).
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doctrines permitted the assignment of liability to government actors for the
conduct of private individuals.7 1
Unless and until the Supreme Court is willing to connect state action (or
inaction) with the problem of domestic violence, other federal legislative
efforts could be subjected to the same analysis. Both the Supreme Court's
decision in Castle Rock and the defeat of the VAWA remedy in Morrison
signal a structural rejection of domestic violence as a matter of nation-state
responsibility in the United States. The countervailing international due
diligence principle obligating the United States to prevent domestic
violence has not and will not be enough on its own to unravel the precedent
against nation-state responsibility established by the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, as this Article was being written, members of Congress
were in an unexpected tug of war between the Senate and the House
versions of the reauthorization of the surviving VAWA provisions.72
Traditionally, reauthorization of the bill has been customary, enjoying
bipartisan support and "little controversy." 73 However, the extension of
protections to immigrants and same-sex individuals in VAWA has been
politicized by the conservative majority in the House of Representatives. 74
So, in addition to the difficult precedent against federal legislative
mandates for government liability for failed OP enforcement, even the
larger protections that VAWA affords are subject to political pressures.
Similar political constraints and compromises could befall any attempt to
legislate federal liability for domestic violence. As such, federal legislation
is perhaps the least likely avenue to Lenahan compliance.
C. The Shortcomings of State Legislation
In the absence of any federal mandates concerning the enforcement of
OPs, the damaging and difficult precedent set by DeShaney and Castle
Rock for domestic violence victims seeking relief under federal law has led
many advocates to push for state legislative reform. 5 State legislative
71. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000); see also Julie Goldscheid,

United States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women
Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck Down in the Name of Federalism, 86 CORNELL L. REv.

109 (2000) (discussing the history and origins of the remedy under VAWA and
providing a critique of the Court's decision).
72. Jonathan Weisman, Women FigureAnew in Senate's Latest Battle, N.Y. TIMES
(March 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/us/politics/violence-againstwomen-act-divides-senate.html?_r-1 &pagewanted=all.

73. See id.
74. See id.
75. G. Kristian Miccio, The Death of the FourteenthAmendment: Castle Rock and
Its Progeny, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 277, 314-15 (2011) ("The answer rests in

reforming state tort law, not in attempting to raise constitutional torts. ... Thus, we
need to look to negligence actions against the state. This will require reworking state
tort law by limiting the affect of the [public duty doctrine] and, where applicable, state
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efforts to curtail domestic violence are as old as the nation itself, but have
achieved mixed results. "Although a law forbidding wife abuse was
enacted in the Massachusetts Bay Colony as early as 1641, civil and
criminal penalties for domestic violence remained rare throughout most of
the nation's history." 76 Legislative efforts to strengthen the enforcement of
OPs have been undertaken in a number of states.7 7 But these efforts fall
short for a number of reasons.
Early shortcomings of OP legislation included: the imposition of filing
fees, mandates that clerks assist victims to seek orders without funding for
adequate training or supervision, lack of provisions regarding the issuance
of emergency OPs after-hours, mandated personal service on the batterer,
lack of tracking or monitoring, and weak penalties for violations. 78 Modern
OP statutes fail for other reasons, including, inter alia: underenforcement,
the creation of obstacles to filing suit, the lack of a mandate to investigate
reported violations, and the unusual creation of short-term protection by
imposing arbitrary time limits on the duty to arrest.8 0
Even when legislative efforts are comprehensive and complete, the
practical application of the laws by law enforcement and the courts often
produces a number of unintended consequences. Leigh Goodmark notes
several that have resulted from attempts to legislate solutions to domestic
violence, including: the penalization of women who stay in an abusive
relationship, perpetuation of the assumption that women should turn to the
legal system for assistance, the increased danger that can result from
engaging the legal system, the devaluation of non-physical violence, the
deprivation of victim agency and dignity, the inability of the legal system
to realize the potential of the law, and the lack of particularized solutions
immunity acts in cases of police refusal to enforce orders of protection."); cf Burella v.
City of Philadelphia, 501 F.3d 134, 153-54 (3d Cir. 2007) (Ambro, Circuit J.,
concurring) (suggesting that state tort reform may "prove to be a Potemkin village"); C.

Keith Marshall, Jr., Russia's Lack of American-Style Agency Principles: A Primary
Cause of Corporate Governance Problems Today, 8 S.C. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 131, 133

(2011) ("[T]he phrase 'Potemkin village' has come to signify a facade meant to
impress and mislead (i.e., to hide some undesirable fact or condition).").

76. Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic
Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29

CARDozo L. REV. 1487, 1494 (2008).

77. See Kathryn E. Litchman, Punishing the Protectors: The Illinois Domestic
Violence Act Remedy for Victims of Domestic Violence Against Police Misconduct, 38

Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 765, 801-20 (2007) (discussing the remedies provided by several
states).
78. PETER FINN & SARAH COLSON, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS: LEGISLATION,
CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT 15 (1990).
79. See Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1717,

1719 (2006) (identifying domestic violence as an "underenforcement zone" evidencing
"distributive and democratic failure").
80. See Litchman, supra note 77, at 802-13 (discussing limitations of the OP
enforcement legislation in Washington, New York, and California).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013

19

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 3

308

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 21:2

Deborah
for women of color, immigrant women, and poor women.8
Epstein identifies some legislative and administrative efforts that have
resulted in a reduction in "the level of procedural justice accorded to
batterers," noting the empirical connection between abusers' sense of fair
treatment and victim safety suggested by social science data.82 In sum,
although it may be possible to pass state legislation, the unintended
consequences that result when it is translated into action may actually
completely undermine the goal of more effectively providing safety to
victims through OP enforcement.
D. State Human Rights Statutes andLocal Legislative Efforts
A seemingly natural target for advocates seeking to pass state legislation
specific to the Lenahan recommendations might be a state's human rights
statute. A number of states have passed these statutes, which generally
prohibit discrimination on the basis of age, sex, race, creed, color, marital
status, physical or mental handicap, or national origin, and some have
further created state government bureaus for the enforcement of these
statutes. Few of the state human rights statutes on record make specific
reference to domestic violence, though the related provisions regarding
gender discrimination are pertinent because of the potential for equal
protection claims under state constitutions. 84
Federal courts have already struck down a number of equal protection
arguments in OP enforcement cases.8 s The standard articulated in a
81. Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?:

Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventionsfor Battered Women, 23 ST. Louis U.
PUB. L. REV. 7, 19-45 (2004).

82. Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State's Response to
Domestic Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1845, 1847 (2002).
83. At least fifteen states have passed domestic human rights statutes, including
Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.200 (2012)), Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
46a-60 (2012)), District of Columbia (D.C. CODE § 2-1402.01 (2012)), Idaho (IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 67-5901 (2012)), Illinois (775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-102 (2012)), Iowa
(IOWA CODE § 216.5 (2012)), Maine (ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 4552 (2012)), Minnesota
(MINN. STAT. § 363A.02 (2012)), Missouri (Mo. REV. STAT. § 213.010 (2012)),
Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101 (2012)), New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 354-A (2012)), New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-1 (2012)), New York
(N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 290 (McKinney 2012)), Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101
(2012)), and West Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 5-11-1 (2012)). Several of these states
have also established a commission to handle complaints under these statutes,
including Alaska, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New York,
and West Virginia.
84. For example, New York's Human Rights Statute protects domestic violence
victims from employment discrimination, but does not address issues pertaining to OP
enforcement. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a) (McKinney 2012).
85. See, e.g., Hynson v. City of Chester Legal Dep't, 864 F.2d 1026, 1027 (3d Cir.
1988) (denying equal protection claim, but setting forth three-part test to determine
violation); see also Okin v. Village of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep't, 577 F.3d
415, 439 (2d Cir. 2009) (failing to show police policy to discriminate against all
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number of Circuits is nearly impossible to meet because it requires that
plaintiffs engage in the overly burdensome and expensive task of
compiling, requesting, and analyzing statistical data and other evidence of
discrimination. Nearly half of the federal circuits have articulated a threeprong evidentiary burden that plaintiffs must satisfy to prevail on an equal
protection claim: (1) evidence that the police had a policy or custom to
provide less protection to domestic violence victims versus victims of other
violent crimes; (2) the policy had a discriminatory purpose; and (3) plaintiff
was injured as a result of the policy. 6 Some circuits have further narrowed
the first prong of the analysis, requiring that plaintiffs show that the police
discriminated against all women, not just women who are victims of
domestic violence." For similar reasons, state equal protection claims
under the human rights statutes would likely prove to be nearly impossible
to win absent overt and widespread discrimination by police against
women.
To date, most of the cases arising under these statutes address
discriminatory employment practices, discrimination in the provision of
professional services, and other claims unrelated to domestic violence or
OP enforcement. Further examination of the genesis and enforcement of
these statutes and a determination of whether enforcement has led to
corresponding policy change among state administrative agencies is
necessary to determine whether targeting these statutes for amendment to
include the protection of women from domestic violence would be
worthwhile. Even if the statutes could be amended to specifically include
discrimination against victims of domestic violence, the risk of unintended
consequences and the problem of translating the anti-discrimination laws
into police policy and practice for OP enforcement remain.
A number of norm entrepreneurs have petitioned city and county
governments to pass ordinances declaring freedom from domestic violence
as a fundamental human right.88 To date, these ordinances have served a
women, not just victims of domestic violence); Burella v. City of Philadelphia, 501
F.3d 134, 149 (3d Cir. 2007) (equal protection claim failed for lack of statistical
evidence showing discrimination). But cf Watson v. Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 696
(10th Cir. 1988) (finding police liable for violation of victim's right to equal protection
applying rational basis scrutiny); Thurman v. Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1529-30
(D. Conn. 1984) (equal protection case where city systematically failed to provide

victims with adequate protection over a certain period of time, reflective of
discriminatory purpose and policy).
86. Hynson, 864 F.2d at 1031.
87. Okin, 577 F.3d at 438.
88. Such ordinances have been passed in Cincinnati, Ohio; Baltimore, Maryland;
and, most recently, in Miami-Dade County, Florida. Cincinnati, Ohio, Res. No. 472011 (Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://city-egov.cincinnati-oh.gov/Webtop/ws/
council/public/child/Blob/33497.pdf~jsessionid=04A85735B29385693C8122F3BD3C
A95B?m=32372; Balt., Md., Res. 12-0034 (Mar. 19, 2012), available at
http://legistar.baltimorecitycouncil.com/attachments/8911.pdf; Miami-Dade Cnty., Fla.,
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largely symbolic role, their substance not directly addressing the issue of
municipal liability. 89 Although doubtless a creative and innovative normshifting strategy (one could imagine the potential utility of local legislation
in persuading judges and state legislative decision makers to reframe
domestic violence as a human rights issue), the effectiveness of local
legislation in effecting police policy and practice regarding OP
enforcement remains to be seen.
Until more effective legislative reforms gain momentum, a more fruitful
path may be to allege and litigate violations of state and municipal duties
under local tort laws. As will be discussed in-depth in the next two parts,
there are a number of common elements of municipal tort liability shared
among states, and infusing liability arguments with the human rights values
expressed in the Lenahan decision remains one of the most promising
avenues for achieving the outcomes sought by the Commission.
IV. DUE DILIGENCE DEFINED: FORESEEABILITY AND PREVENTION

One of the earliest legal expressions of a nation-state's duty to exercise
due diligence to prevent breaches of international law, even those involving
private conduct by non-states, is found in the famous 1872 international
arbitration at the conclusion of the Civil War.90 In an arbitration commonly
referred to as "The Alabama Claims Arbitration," arbiters found that Great
Britain had violated its treaty obligations as a "neutral" under the Treaty of
Washington by providing assistance to the Confederate troops through the
provision of warships. 9 ' The analysis of due diligence and its relationship
Resolution Expressing the Board's Intent to Declare That the Freedom from Domestic

Violence Is a Fundamental Human Right (July 17, 2012) [hereinafter Miami-Dade
Cnty. Resolution], available at http://www.miamidade.gov/govaction/legistarfiles/
Matters/Y2012/121380.pdf.
89. None of the ordinances explicitly discuss municipal liability, which is
unsurprising since such language could increase a municipality's exposure to lawsuits
and might therefore render the ordinance politically unviable. See Res. No. 47-2011;
Res. 12-0034; Miami-Dade Cnty. Resolution.
90. While earlier expressions of the underlying concepts of state responsibility that
gave rise to the "due diligence" principle can be found as early as 1000 B.C., modem
legal expressions of due diligence emerged in the late 18th and 19th centuries. See IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 440-41, 455, 526 (7th ed.
2008). See generally Jan Arno Hessbruegge, The Historical Development of the
Doctrines ofAttribution and Due Diligence in InternationalLaw, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.

& POL. 265, 267 (2004) (providing a detailed description of the historical development
of state responsibility and the due diligence principle).
91. U.S. Dep't of State, The Case of the United States, to Be Laid Before the
Tribunal of Arbitration, to Be Convened at Geneva Under the Provisions of the Treaty
Between the United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain,
Concluded at Washington, May 8, 1871 97, 130 (1872) [hereinafter Alabama Case],
available at http://archive.org/details/cihm 34251 ("The United States understand that
the diligence which is called for by the Rules of the Treaty of Washington is a due
diligence; that is, a diligence proportioned to the magnitude of the subject and to the
dignity and strength of the Power which is to exercise it . . .. No diligence short of this
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to negligence in the Alabama case is instructive:
"Negligence," which is only the absence of the diligence which the
nature and merits of any particular subject and the exigencies of any
particular case demand as "due" from the nature of its inherent
circumstances, implies blamable fault, called in the Roman law culpa,
with responsibility for consequences. The idea of obligation, either legal
or moral, and of responsibility for its non-performance, is found in all the
forms and applications of the question, either of diligence or of
negligence .... "A fault is blamable through want of taking proper care;
and it obliges the person who does the injury, because by an application
of due diligence it might have been foreseen and prevented." 92
Importantly, the dual paradigms of foreseeability and prevention
reflected in the historical roots of the due diligence principle are replete in
both domestic municipal tort and international liability assessments, and
therefore provide a consistent framework to link present-day analyses of
each together. 9 3 Although the due diligence principle has continued to
evolve since the Alabama case, its specific application in the context of
nation-state liability for harms inflicted by individual non-state actors
94
remain vague, unsettled, and rather specific to the type of harm alleged.
Not all of the international tribunals and instruments examining nation-state
liability for the human rights abuses of individual non-state actors have
framed the issue as one of due diligence.9 5 An analysis of the due diligence
principle and municipal tort liability within the specific context of failed
enforcement of protective orders and domestic violence elucidates the
contours of government responsibility within the foreseeability and
would be 'due;' that is, commensurate with the emergency, or with the magnitude of

the results of negligence.... That a neutral is bound to use due diligence to prevent the
fitting out, arming, or equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has
reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on war against a Power

with which it is at peace."); see also Tom Bingham, The Alabama Claims Arbitration,

54 INT. & COMP. L. Q. 1, 1-25 (Jan. 2005) (including a detailed historical analysis of
the facts of the case, the legal arguments presented, and the decisions of the arbiters).

92. Alabama Case, supra note 91, at 91-92 (citations omitted).
93. See discussion infra.
94. See Robert P. Barnidge, Jr., The Due Diligence Principle Under International
Law, 8 INT'L CMTY. L. REV. 81, 121 (2006) ("The due diligence principle is especially

important under international law because it can be applied to varied facts and
circumstances... . How, whether, and with what breadth the due diligence principle is
applied, however, remains one of political will."); see generally Andr6 Nollkaemper,

Concurrence Between Individual Responsibility and State Responsibility in
InternationalLaw, 52 INT'L. & COMP. L. Q. 615 (2003) (discussing the conflation of

individual and state responsibility in recent prosecutions of international war crimes
and the implications for the role of "intent" in finding fault and assigning liability).

95. See Johanna Bourke-Martignoni, The History and Development of the Due

Diligence Standard in InternationalLaw and Its Role in the Protection of Women
Against Violence, in DUE DILIGENCE AND ITS APPLICATION TO PROTECT WOMEN FROM

47, 51 (Carin Benninger-Budel ed., 2008) (citing cases from the European
Court of Human Rights and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights).
VIOLENCE
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prevention paradigms.
A. The Due Diligence Principleas Applied to Cases ofDomestic Violence
The use of the due diligence principle to determine nation-state
responsibility in cases involving gender-based violence have clarified some
of its vagaries within this specific context.96 The main expressions of
nation-state responsibility under this principle are found in the decisions of
the Inter-American system and the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, the monitoring body of the main
international declaration respecting women's rights, The Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 97
The first articulation of the due diligence principle as applied to a case
involving international human rights was the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights' 1988 decision in Velisquez Rodriguez v. Honduras.9 8 This
case established the responsibility of nation-states to protect individuals
against harms committed by non-state actors, whether or not the actor
could be identified, shifting the focus off of the harm itself and onto the
inadequacy of the nation-state's measures to prevent and investigate a
This
human rights violation committed within its territory.99
groundbreaking decision laid the foundation for individuals to seek redress
for human rights abuses committed by non-state actors, specifically cases
involving domestic violence.
Over a decade later, the Commission applied the due diligence principle
in assigning fault to the nation of Brazil in Maria da Penha Maia
Fernandesv. Brazil, a 2001 case in which a woman nearly died as a result
96. See id. at 47, 61 (presenting a history of the development of the due diligence

principal as it pertains to gender-based violence). Ms. Bourke-Martignoni is somewhat
skeptical of the promise of due diligence for nation-state responsibility to prevent
domestic violence, protect women from it, and provide remedies to victims. Id. at 61.
It is important to note, however, that she wrote her analysis prior to the Lenahan
decision, in which the Commission articulated specific parameters for assigning nationstate responsibility, focused on foreseeability and prevention.
97. See VelAsquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4
(July 29, 1988); Convention of Beldm do Pard, arts. 2, 7, 8, 9, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1534; Maria da Penha v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
54/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.1 11 doc. 20 rev. 45-58 (2001); The Situation of the Rights of
Women in Ciudad Judrez, Mexico: The Right to Be Free from Violence and

Discrimination, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., OEA/Ser. L/V/II. 117, doc. 44, March 7,
99-107; Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
2003,
(CEDAW), Gen. Rec. 19, Violence Against Women (Eleventh session, 1992), U.N.
Doc. A/47/38 at 1, 9 (1993).
98. Velasquez Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No, 4, T 172.
99. Id. ("An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not
directly imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a private person or
because the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to international
responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due
diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the Convention.").
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of domestic violence at the hands of her husband.0oo This case and those
that followed articulated the duty of the state to prevent, investigate and
punish domestic violence within its territory under its due diligence
obligations, and to "protect the victim and provide a legal remedy for her as
a woman at risk of or subjected to domestic violence; and to ensure that
these obligations are given effect in the domestic legal system."lot
The Inter-American Commission's decision in Lenahan is the first use of
the due diligence principle to assign to the United States a duty to protect
individual victims of domestic violence from harm inflicted by non-state
actors, specifically through the effective enforcement of orders of
protection. Expanding upon earlier rulings, the Commission took note of
four principles emerging from the development of the standard over the
previous decade, representing an "evolving law and practice related to the
application of the due diligence standard in cases of violence against
women":
(1) "a State may incur international responsibility for failing to act
with due diligence to prevent, investigate, sanction and offer
reparations for acts of violence against women; a duty which may
apply to actions committed by private actors in certain
circumstances"; 02
(2) "the States' duty to address violence against women also involves
measures to prevent and respond to the discrimination that
perpetuates the problem";10 3
(3) States are obligated to "guarantee access to adequate and effective
judicial remedies for victims and their family members when they
suffer acts of violence";104 and
(4) "certain groups of women [are] at particular risk for acts of
violence due to having been subjected to discrimination based on
more than one factor, among these girl-children, and women
pertaining to ethnic, racial, and minority groups; a factor which
must be considered by [Nation-States] in the adoption of measures

100. Maria da Penha, Case 12.05 1, Report No. 54/01, % 8-9, 55-58 (explaining that
Maria's husband shot her while she was sleeping, the culmination of a series of abuses
including electric shock applied to her while she was showering. The abuses she
suffered caused her to suffer from tetraplegia and other injuries).
101. Petition Alleging Violations of the Human Rights of Jessica Gonzales by the
United States of America and the State of Colorado, with Request for an Investigation
and Hearing on the Merits, at 73, Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R., Report No. 80/11 (2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/
petitionallegingviolationsofthehumanrightsofjessicagonzales.pdf.
102. Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11, 126 (internal citations omitted).
103. Id.
104. Id. T 127.
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to prevent all forms of violence."os
In assembling these principles, the Commission both rearticulated
customary international law and also took the opportunity to develop it
further. Principle (1) is a restatement of the due diligence standard as
developed in customary international law. Principles (2) and (4) link the
United States due diligence duties with a broader obligation to address the
systemic discrimination contributing to domestic violence as a means of
prevention-a new development. Most notably, principle (3) further
expands the due diligence principle to a right to judicial remedies. The
values expressed in these principles, establishing state liability and the right
to equal protection and due process, unequivocally renounced the
DeShaney/Castle Rock line of jurisprudence in the United States and
established the due diligence principle as the international legal norm from
which equal protection and due process claims emanate.
Applying the due diligence principle to the facts in the Lenahan case, the
Commission looked at two main factors: (1) "the authorities' knowledge
that victims were in a situation of risk"; and (2) "measures taken to protect
the victims." 106 Both the Commission in Lenahan and the Supreme Court's
dissent in Castle Rock situated their analysis within the same framework.
Although the dissenting Supreme Court Justices were not addressing
municipal tort liability questions specifically, they used state liability
theories to justify their reasons why the State of Colorado should have been
liable for the enforcement failures under federal constitutional law. The
majority opinion also focused on state liability, but essentially found that
the states had jurisdiction to decide liability under their own laws, refusing
to subsume state liability standards into federal civil rights laws. 10 7
Examining the analysis in each reveals the Commission's tacit support of
dissenting Justices in Castle Rock, 08 as well as the promise of municipal
tort liability as an alternative strategy for achieving state responsibility.
1. Foreseeability:Authorities'Knowledge That Victims Were in a Situation
ofRisk
With respect to the government's ability to foresee the kidnapping and
killing of Ms. Lenahan's three daughters in violation of the protective
order, the Commission determined that the issuance of an OP, in and of
itself, was sufficient to establish that the state recognized the risk because it
represented a judicial determination that state protection was required.109
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. % 138-59.
Castle Rock IV, 545 U.S. 748, 760 (2005).
Id. at 773 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11, T 142.
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They placed particular importance on the language contained in the order,
specifically the mandatory arrest language.110 Taking the opposite view of
the Scalia majority in Castle Rock, the Commission noted that the
mandatory arrest terms in the OP were sufficiently strong to create a
reasonable expectation that law enforcement officials would "use every
reasonable effort to protect the alleged victim and her children from
violence.""' The Commission focused on both the reasonableness of the
expectation of police action (reliance) and the reasonableness of the actions
of law enforcement themselves in light of the order and its terms."2 This
dual view of reasonableness within the context of state knowledge of risk is
the most interesting for the purposes of finding common ground with
domestic municipal liability jurisprudence.
As will be discussed infra, after the state's duty has been established,
state municipal liability analyses often assign an additional burden to the
victim to prove that she reasonably relied on the representations of law
enforcement responding to the OP violation complaint. Both the states and
the Commission take into account the reasonableness of the victim's
reliance, but unlike the states, the Commission does not require the victim
to prove that her actions were reasonable in response to the police action on
the OP. Rather, it ascertains what reliance would have been reasonable in
light of the actual language of the OP itself and keeps the burden on law
enforcement to show that its actions were in keeping with what the victim
could have reasonably expected.
The Commission's analysis reframes liability in terms of what the police
did or did not do to protect the victim, not whether the victim was
reasonable in relying on whatever protection was offered. In keeping with
this framework, the Commission found that the state should have been
aware of the potential risk of harm and that the "proper response would
have required the existence of protocols or directives and training on how
to implement restraining orders, and how to respond to calls such as those
placed by Jessica Lenahan."" 3 Having determined that the state could have
foreseen the harm to Ms. Lenahan and her children, the Commission
moved to the second prong of its analysis: actions taken to prevent the
143-44 ("Therefore, the Commission considers that the State's
110. Id.
recognition of risk in this domestic violence situation through the issuance of a
restraining order-and the terms of said order-is a relevant element in assessing the
human rights implications of the State's action or inaction in responding to the facts
presented in this case.").
111. Id. 144. In Castle Rock, Justice Scalia wrote: "We do not believe that these
provisions of Colorado law truly made enforcement of restraining orders mandatory. A
well established tradition of police discretion has long coexisted with apparently
mandatory arrest statutes." Castle Rock IV, 545 U.S at 760.
112. Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11, T 144.
113. Id.T145.
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harm.
2. Prevention: Measures Undertaken to Protect the Victims
In examining the actions of the Castle Rock Police Department in
response to Ms. Lenahan's calls on the evening in question, the
Commission looked to a number of documents created by advocates
nationally and within the state of Colorado to determine "the minimum
measures that police authorities should have adopted to determine whether
the order at issue had been violated."I 14 These documents included model
policies and law enforcement training manuals, which the state of Colorado
cited in their defense to illustrate the positive actions taken at the state level
to respond to domestic violence and train police." 5 Interestingly, the police
practice norms created by advocates thus served as the basis for the
Commission's determination as to whether the Castle Rock Police
Department's practices were sufficient to prevent the human rights
violation alleged. The Commission determined that the Colorado police
department failed to implement the model enforcement policies available to
them in any meaningful way."16
Even more interesting is what the Commission did not examine:
Colorado state law, actual Castle Rock Police Department policies, or the
policies of other police departments within the state of Colorado. Imagine
if advocates had not taken the time to articulate model OP enforcement
strategies. What would the Commission have used as a benchmark for
adequate protection measures? This illustrates the potential influence of
advocates aligning their interests and creating norm sources from which
adjudicative bodies can sample to construct a standard of conduct where
none formally exists. In comparing the actions of the Castle Rock Police
Department with the model policies available to them, the Commission
found the police response to be "fragmented, uncoordinated and
unprepared" and therefore insufficient to prevent the foreseeable harms that
occurred.11 7 The Commission ends this part of the analysis with an
expression of concern over the tendency for states to shift the burden onto
the victim to monitor the prevention functions of the police."' This
seemingly minor point in the Commission's analysis may in fact be the
most powerful for advocates.

114. Id. 148.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id. T 151-59.
Id. 150.
Id. 158.
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3. Absence ofFocus on the Reasonableness of the Victim's Reliance

Notably, the Commission does not focus on the reasonableness of Ms.
Lenahan's reliance on the actions or inactions of the police in their due
diligence analysis, apart from finding that the language of the OP itself
induced reasonable reliance. In fact, the Commission expressly eschews
the idea that victims should be responsible for ascertaining whether or not
police have acted on a violation complaint and if so, whether the police
have neutralized the threat." 9 Yet domestic case law consistently places
the burden on the victim to do just that.12 0
This use of this so-called "reasonable battered mother test"l21 is
irresponsible in the context of OP enforcement because it shifts the analysis
away from the prevention measures taken by the state and reframes
enforcement in terms of the reasonableness of the victim's reliance on
those measures. Rather than viewing the enforcement failure in the context
of the system that is solely responsible for it, it shifts the entire analysis
onto one individual's actions within that system. Such an analysis
incentivizes vague responses to victim inquiries regarding enforcement: the
fewer the concrete assurances made to the victim, the less reasonable her
reliance on them. Thus, enforcement becomes nothing more than a sham
and the OP returns to its legally insignificant status. Stopping short of
strict liability, the intemational due diligence standard does not assess
blame to the state anytime a victim has been harmed due to failed
enforcement. Rather, it assesses the foreseeability of the harm suffered and
the adequacy of the means to prevent it as the sole prongs of the analysis.
This type of analysis assesses the reasonableness of the state's action, not
the victim's response.
Parsing the reasoning of state courts and examining closely their
rationale in those cases illuminates the potential for litigants to prevent the
shifting of the burden from the state to the victim by refraining
"reasonableness" in terms of what law enforcement did or did not do rather
than the victim 's actions subsequent. Using the due diligence principle and
the Commission's application of it with respect to foreseeability and
prevention could create avenues for domesticating the principles of
Lenahan through municipal tort litigation.
119. Id.

120. See discussion infra.

121. G. Kristian Miccio articulated the "Reasonable Battered Mother Test" as a
proposed solution to statutes that prosecuted victims for the abuse perpetrated against
them if it was visited upon them in the presence of their children. In those cases, a
mother's action or inaction is viewed in light of the abuse she suffered, not the
representations made to her by the state. See G. Kristian Miccio, A Reasonable
Battered Mother? Redefining, Reconstructing, and Recreating the Battered Mother in
Child ProtectiveProceedings,22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 89, 94 (1999).
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V. THE PROMISE AND CRUX OF MUNICIPAL TORT LITIGATION:
INTERNATIONAL DUE DILIGENCE CONTRASTED WITH STATES' SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP TEST

In addition to federal and state legislative efforts, the Commission
further requires that the United States develop "programs to train public
officials in all branches of the administration of justice and police" targeted
at "restructuring the stereotypes of domestic violence victims" and
promoting "the eradication of discriminatory socio-cultural patterns that
impede women and children's full protection from domestic violence
acts," 22 functions that fit squarely within the purview of state and
municipal governments. Calling on local governments to create policies
and protocols, the Commission invokes yet another layer of complexity
within the federalist framework. Because municipal governments are
political subdivisions of the state, they do not enjoy sovereign rights and
duties and are thus subject to a common law regime that determines their
duties to the individual.123 However, like the international due diligence
analysis, the dual assessment of foreseeability and prevention of the harm
are hallmarks of liability assessment in domestic municipal tort law.' 24
Because Jessica Lenahan's attorneys did not advance a common law
municipal liability theory the domestic courts never addressed it.125 It is
remarkable then, that the Commission essentially used the international due

122. Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11,

215(6).

123. For a detailed discussion of the origins and development of municipal tort law
immunities, see Gerald P. Krause, Municipal Liability: The Failure to Provide
Adequate Police Protection-The Special Duty Doctrine Should Be Discarded, 1984
Wis. L. REV. 499 (1984). See also DAN B. DOBBs, THE LAW OF TORTS 720-32 (West
Group 2000).

124. Foreseeability and prevention, typically attributed to the individual actor, are
also applicable to governments to the extent that they indemnify their individual
employees for actions within the scope of their duties, which is the case when police
fail to enforce orders of protection. See Krause, supra note 123, at 524 ("The use of an

ordinary negligence standard would not impose an absolute duty upon a municipality's

police department to protect its citizens and enforce its laws; nor would it require that
the police be at the scene of every crime. Rather, police departments would be held to
a standard of due care, and their liability appropriately limited by the requirements of
proximate cause and foreseeability."); see also Timothy D. Lytton, Responsibilityfor
Human Suffering: Awareness, Participation, and the Frontiers of Tort Law, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 470, 472-83 (1993) (identifying "awareness" and "participation" as
two paradigms of responsibility for harm in the context of individual actors); Helen L.
Monaco, The Special Relationship Doctrine in Domestic Protective Order Cases, 61
DEF. CouNs. J. 383, 392 (1994) ("Municipalities have a substantial interest in
preventing inadequate police responses to domestic violence situations, either in the
prevention of liability or the loss of life."). See generally Note, Government Tort
Liability, 111 HARV. L. REv. 2009 (1998) (exploring nature of governmental immunity
and tort liability).

125. See Complaint and Jury Demand, Gonzalez v. City of Castle Rock, 2001 WL
35973820 (D. Colo. 2001), 2000 WL 35529077 (alleging constitutional tort theories
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but not alleging common law municipal tort liability).
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diligence standard to re-infuse the case with the tort theory that had been
missing all along. The Commission's novel approach thus uncovered a
potential avenue for recovery through common law municipal tort. As
such, it offers new perspective for the litigation strategy of future cases
brought before the United States court system.
A. Effectiveness of Litigation as a Tool to Affect Police Practicein Cases of
Domestic Violence
Although scholars disagree about the effectiveness of tort litigation in
spurring institutional and social change in other types of cases, 126 domestic
violence tort litigation has a proven record of inspiring change in police
Two
response to domestic violence in a number of states.' 27
groundbreaking cases from New York (Bruno v. Codd) and Connecticut
(Thurman v. City of Torrington) prompted major shifts in police policy and
practice with respect to responding to domestic violence complaints.128
The Bruno case resulted in an out-of-court settlement in which the police
agreed to "develop a pro-arrest policy on woman battering and to require
training for all members of the NYPD (which at the time employed 28,000
126. See, e.g., TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE: How
LAWSUITS HELPED THE CATHOLIC CHURCH CONFRONT CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE (2008);
PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS

(1983); Timothy D. Lytton, Using Tort Litigation to Enhance Regulatory Policy
Making: Evaluating Climate-Change Litigation in Light of Lessons from Gun-Industry

and Clergy-Sexual-Abuse Lawsuits, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1837, 1838 (2008) (offering "a
theoretical framework for evaluating the influence of tort litigation on regulatory policy
making."); Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of
Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REv. 1023, 1025 (2010)

("A host of distinguished scholars have offered multiple theories about why civil rights
damages actions-and the millions of dollars paid out each year in these cases-will
not effectively deter police department officials from engaging in future
unconstitutional behavior. An equally accomplished group has defended the deterrent
power of civil rights damages actions.").
127. "The pressure of lawsuits altered the response of police agencies to domestic
violence. 'Between 1985 and 2000, many police departments mandated that training
sessions on family violence should be part of their police academy curricula.' By 1998,
state legislators had enacted laws in 30 states and the District of Columbia to encourage
or require police training on the subject of domestic violence." KELLY WEISBERG,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: LEGAL AND SOCIAL REALITY 269 (2012) (citations omitted)
(quoting Albert R. Roberts & Karel Kurst-Swagner, Police Responses to Battered
Women: Past,Present andFuture, in HANDBOOK OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STRATEGIES:
POLICIES, PROGRAMS AND LEGAL REMEDIES 101, 105 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 2002)).

128. See Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1525-26 (D. Conn.
1984) (Despite numerous complaints to the police department, victim's husband

continued to harass and attack her, culminating in a violent episode during which her

husband nearly stabbed her to death and kicked her repeatedly in the head in the
presence of their child and police who were ineffective at the scene. The victim's
husband was not arrested until he attempted to assault her while she was lying on a
stretcher); Bruno v. Codd, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1977), rev'd, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165

(App. Div. 1978), aff'd, 393 N.E.2d 976 (N.Y. 1979) (stating multiple sworn
statements allege police called to the scene of domestic violence would refuse to assist
the wife, despite visible evidence of abuse).
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officers) on the appropriate police response."1 29 In Thurman, a Connecticut
federal court awarded the plaintiff "$1.9 million in her lawsuit against the
city of Torrington and twenty-four city police officers as the result of the
department's policy and practice of nonintervention and nonarrest in
domestic violence cases."l 30 The court found that the City of Torrington
had 'condoned a pattern or practice of affording inadequate protection, or
no protection at all, to women who have complained of having been abused
by their husbands or others with whom they have had close relations.' 13
The specific outcomes in these cases were groundbreaking, but
simultaneous efforts in research circles inside and outside of police forces
would complement the litigation and add further detail to the emerging
police policies. While these cases were pending, researchers were
compiling what would become a "pivotal" study in domestic violence proarrest response research: the Minneapolis domestic violence experiment.132
The Minneapolis experiment found that "arrest was the most effective
response, as there were nearly twice as many incidents of repeat violence
by offenders who were not arrested, as compared with those who were
arrested."l 3 3 Formal policy recommendations from police groups also
surfaced during this time period (1976-1984), including those from the
International Association of Chiefs of Police, the Police Executive
Research Forum, and the National Institute of Justice. 134 Unlike the policy
and practice changes that resulted from the litigation in New York and
Connecticut, these recommendations, while essential to changing public
opinion and even police perceptions of domestic violence, did very little to
effect changes in police policy.135
The Bruno and Thurman cases involved the same fundamental issue as
the Castle Rock/Lenahan case: whether police, when responding to a call of
domestic violence, engage in a course of action that favors arrest as the
default. The pro-arrest policies that emerged as a response to Bruno and
Thurman were wrought in the absence of the weight of precedent. In the
years that followed, discussions regarding the proper state response to
domestic violence evolved in depth and complexity among advocates and
decision-makers alike. The question then becomes, how could an arguably
stronger case in Castle Rock/Lenahan, in a state with a mandatory arrest
129. Frisch & Caruso, supra note 46, at 112 ("In Bruno, the New York City police,

the probation department, and the family court were accused of denying battered
women the legal protection to which they were entitled under state law.").
130. Id.
131. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1529 (quoting the plaintiff s complaint).
132. Frisch & Caruso, supra note 46, at 113-16.
133. Id. at 114.

134. Id. at 116-19.
135.

Id.
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statute and mandatory arrest language standard in its orders of protection,
result in a finding that police do not have a duty to apply the mechanisms
that they established two decades prior? How could litigation be so much
more effective during a time when we knew so much less about domestic
violence?
An important part of the answer is that the pro-arrest movement began
locally, state-by-state. The Supreme Court made it clear in Castle Rock
that police liability for OP enforcement is also a state-by-state
determination. 136 By taking a state-by-state approach through municipal
liability statutes, rather than seeking a federal tort remedy, the future of OP
enforcement litigation strategy could look more like the litigation giving
rise to pro-arrest policies. This aim is distinguishable from other types of
domestic violence tort litigation that have not resulted in a favorable
outcome, which is discussed here as a word of caution should the municipal
tort movement become reality.
B. Examples of Unsuccessful Domestic Violence Tort Litigation
Municipal tort liability can be distinguished from other, less successful,
attempts to litigate domestic violence as a tort. For example, claims for the
intentional torts of domestic violence are rarely brought by victims because
of the exclusion of intentional torts from individual liability insurance
policies, statutes of limitations, procedural barriers to filing suit, social
stigma, and the lack of awareness that such claims can be brought, among
other things. 137 These types of claims are easily distinguishable because
they are aimed at punishing the individual abuser rather than the system
that passively permitted the abuser to do harm. They have no potential to
influence police practice respecting the enforcement of OPs.
Other types of claims distinguishable from municipal tort liability are
those involving police brutality or misconduct. Empirical and anecdotal
evidence shows that many police forces, including the New York Police
Department, do not change their policies in response to unfavorable claims
against individual officers in these cases and, in fact, regularly ignore
information from lawsuits.' 38 But these cases are also distinguishable from
136. Castle Rock IV, 545 U.S. 748, 764-65 (2005).

137. See Deana A. Pollard, Sex Torts, 91 MINN. L. REv. 769, 809-10 (2007)
(advocating for liability for infliction of a sexually transmitted disease); Jennifer
Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 121, 129-52 (2001)
(articulating the reasons why domestic violence victims are reluctant to bring
intentional tort suits against their abusers); Jennifer Wriggins, Toward a Feminist
Revision of Torts, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 139, 157-59 (2005)
(proposing a mandatory system of tort liability insurance covering intentional torts
involving domestic violence and urging a gender-based reframing of tort law in legal
scholarship).
138. Schwartz, supra note 126, at 1041-59.
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municipal tort litigation because they focus on the individual police actor
and not the functions of the police force as a whole. Failed OPs are not a
function of individual police action, but involve multiple failures beginning
the moment that the dispatcher accepts the call alerting the police to a
violation. As such, they are more likely to result in a change in the policy
and practice of the response to OP violation complaints because the
liability results from the actions of several individuals within the police
force rather than a few errant members of the force.
Another distinction between police misconduct cases and municipal tort
litigation is that police misconduct cases assign liability for an abuse of
power, typically through use of force, but municipal tort cases assign
liability for the failure to act-or the failure to act in a manner
commensurate with the duty assumed. In OP enforcement, exposure to
municipal liability is ongoing unless the appropriate policies and
procedures are in place and followed. Police misconduct cases involve a
much narrower exposure to risk in that the liability of the state arises from
an individual act of police malfeasance, which ends upon its commissionnot an ongoing breach of duty through inaction.139
Finally, it is important to note that the goal in both of these types of tort
claims is to punish and deter certain conduct rather than to incentivize it.
Intentional tort and police misconduct cases are aimed at deterring violent
acts against victims. To the extent that police misconduct cases are also
aimed toward changing police practice, the practice sought to be changed
are policies to deter bad conduct by individual members of the force.
Alternatively, municipal tort litigation, in the specific context of failed OPs,
is aimed at incentivizing the creation of better police practices because
liability arises from the absence of action, which can only be cured by
incentivizing conduct, not deterring it.
As discussed in the next section, New York state courts have provided a
wealth of opinions revealing the potential of claims arising out of the
An examination of the
common law of municipal tort liability.
international standard of "due diligence" in tandem with these domestic
articulations of municipal tort liability reveals that the elements of due
diligence resemble those found in domestic tort law. The resemblance ends
at a crucial point: New York State assigns victims an additional burden to
prove that they reasonably relied on the assertions made by the police that
the order would be enforced; the due diligence standard remains focused on
the nation-state's ability to foresee, prevent, and protect the victim and to
punish the perpetrator.
139. But see Goldscheid, Rethinking Civil Rights, supra note 57 (urging the reconceptualization of "law enforcement's under-responsiveness to domestic and sexual

violence claims" as a part of the "continuum of police misconduct").
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This burden shifting from the state to the victim is reflective of the
larger, structural issue of inherent discrimination against victims of
domestic violence in the American legal system, which international law
seeks to address.140 Using New York State's municipal liability standard
and related court rulings as a case study, the evolution of this shift becomes
apparent and it is possible to identify potential gaps in the jurisprudence
that may be informed by international standards.
C. New York's Suitability as a Test State
New York is ripe for initial experimentation with domesticating due
diligence because of its well-developed coordinated community responsel41
to domestic violence and its rich history in examining and affecting change
in police practice. Since the 1990s, police departments and advocates in
New York State have engaged in "planned-change experiences," involving
the formulation, implementation and evaluation of police policies to
criminalize domestic violence with the ultimate goal of influencing police
departments to adopt pro-arrest domestic violence response policies. 42In
addition, the state's Office for the Prevention of Domestic Violence
(OPDV) has been a leader in creating model OP enforcement policies and
corresponding training curriculum for police statewide.1 43
It is unsurprising, then, that the coordinated community response in New
York State has been raising awareness about the Lenahan case for years.
After the initial filing of Ms. Lenahan's petition before the Commission,
advocates in New York hosted a number of conferences and trainings
concerning the framing of freedom from domestic violence as a human
right.14 4 The International Women's Human Rights Law Clinic at the City
140. See Rebecca J. Cook, State Responsibility for Violations of Women's Human
Rights, 7 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 125, 154-56 (1994); G. Kristian Miccio, A House
Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the Conservatization of the
Battered Women's Movement, 42 Hous. L. REV. 237, 261-64 (2005). See generally
James Martin Truss, The Subjection of Women ... Still: Unfulfilled Promises of
Protectionfor Women Victims ofDomestic Violence, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1149 (1995).
141. A coordinated community response to domestic violence involves much more
than the police. To be effective, it must be comprised of community leaders, domestic
violence advocates, stakeholders and decision makers at the federal, state, and local
levels, law enforcement, survivors, and their families.
142. Frisch & Caruso, supra note 46, at 102-3 1.
143. The OPDV has assembled a number of model policies and training materials
regarding OP enforcement and police liability. See Johanna Sullivan & James A.
Murphy, Coordinated and Consistent Enforcement of Violations of Orders of
Protection Can Be a Crucial Tool in Stopping Domestic Violence, NEW YORK OFFICE
(July
1,
2012),
OF
DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
FOR
THE
PREVENTION

http://www.opdv.ny.gov/professionals/criminaljustice/nyptiarticle.html.
144. Between 2007 and 2008, several non-profit organizations hosted trainings,

conferences and workshops with the theme of freedom from domestic violence as a
human right. See Bettinger-Lopez, supra note 34, at 60-62.
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University of New York and the Center for Constitutional Rights were the
lead drafters of an amicus brief filed in the case.14 5 Because a number of
litigators and advocates in New York have been strategizing about how to
reframe the issue for much longer than those in other states, it is likely that
some of the first examples of experimental domestic OP enforcement
litigation using the Lenahan decision will come from New York State.
New York is also one of the first states in which litigation began to make
an impact on OP enforcement prior to the coordinated efforts of the
community response. "As long ago as 1966, an appeals court in Baker v.
City of New York, ruled that a person issued a protection order is owed a
special duty of care by the police department." 4 6 Arguably, the State of
New York thus assumed the duty to enforce orders of protection prior to
the creation of the international duty for nation-states to do so. Because of
the depth of New York jurisprudence on this topic, it provides an intricate
anthology to study and from which to ascertain pattern and meaning in the
rulings of the courts.
D. New York State Municipal Tort Liability Jurisprudenceand Its
Shortcomings
As a general rule, municipalities are not liable for injuries arising out of
a failure to provide police protection.14 7 The initial assessment of
government immunity often hinges on whether or not the actions taken by
the official in protection of the individual are discretionary, as opposed to
mandatory.14 8 This is an analysis subject to multiple interpretations of what
actions implicate the officer's individual ability to choose a course of
action.149 But this governmental immunity analysis is created by statute,
and separate from any common law special duty.
The common law duties that exist in the vast majority of states are a
145. Brief for International Women's Human Rights Law Clinic, City University Of
New York, as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Lenahan v. United States, Case
12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 80/11 (2011), available at
see
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/womensrights/gonzales domestic 20081020.pdf;
also Jessica Gonzalez v. U.S.A., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 24, 2011),
http://www.aclu.org/human-rights-womens-rights/j essica-gonzales-v-usa.
146. FINN & COLSON, supra note 78, at 59 (internal citations omitted).
147. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7 cmt. g (2010).
See generally Krause, supra note 123 (providing an overview of sovereign immunity,
the special duty doctrine within the specific context of police protection, and municipal
liability).
148. 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, etc., Tort Liability § 73 (2012) ("In distinguishing
between discretionary acts and ministerial functions, some courts hold that when state
law confers a power on its governmental units for the public good, there arises a
corresponding obligation to perform the duty, and tort liability may be imposed for
failure to discharge it; discretionary immunity will not apply.").
149. See id. (discussing tort liability immunities of individual government actors).
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unique, non-statutory exception to the general rule of governmental
immunity and give rise to avenues for individuals to seek redress from the
state for injuries that arise from the conduct of third parties when the police
enter into a "special relationship" with the victim.150 Such a relationship
arises through either the existence of an OP and reasonable reliance on its
terms or when the police create a dangerous situation or render a citizen
more vulnerable to danger.15 1 Proximate cause in these cases typically
hinges on the reasonableness of the victim's reliance on the representations
of the state-therein lies the opportunity for creative litigants to use the due
diligence principles articulated in international law to shift the focus off the
victim and onto the nature of the foreseeable risks to the victim arising
from the adequacy of the state's response to domestic violence. 152
New York has adopted a "special relationship" theory of municipal tort
liability.153 The test to determine whether a special relationship exists
requires four elements:
(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of
an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured;
(2) knowledge on the part of the municipality's agents that inaction
could lead to harm;
(3) some form of direct contact between the municipality's agents and
the injured party; and
(4) that party's justifiable reliance on the municipality's affirmative
150. Most states have adopted a "special relationship" test, but few have applied it in
cases of municipal liability for failed OP enforcement. See generally Eaton, supra note
18, §§ 8-10. Examples of states that have include Alaska and Arizona, which have
both adopted the "special relationship" doctrine found in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 315 (1965) ("There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as
to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless (a) a special relation exists
between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control
the third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the
other which gives to the other a right to protection.") and applied it to OP enforcement
cases. Dore v. City of Fairbanks, 31 P.3d 788, 793-94 (Alaska 2001) (determining no
special relationship between police and children of abusive father who killed their
mother and then killed himself in violation of an OP protecting mother); Wertheim v.
Pima County, 122 P.3d 1, 3-4 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (determining no special
relationship between police and wife's lover, shot and killed by her husband, despite
OP against husband, held by wife, prohibiting him from owning firearms; OP was
never served on husband). Maryland also discussed § 315 of the Restatement (Second)
in finding that a special relationship could exist under the Maryland Police standing
domestic violence response order, depending on the representations made by police in
responding to a call for domestic violence. Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 753 A.2d
41, 64 (2000).
151. See Esposito Eaton, supra note 18, § 2[a].
152. See Krause, supra note 123, at 509 ("The primary problem with the special
duty requirement is that it is a poor risk spreader; the costs of municipal negligence are
thrust upon the individual instead of being borne by the entire community.").
153. "Municipalities in New York state owe police protection to the community as a
whole but not to any one individual, absent a special duty." Monaco, supra note 124,
at 384 (providing a historical analysis of the development of this special duty in New
York law).
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undertaking. 154
The first three prongs mirror the due diligence framework of
foreseeability and prevention. Although not codified, the first three prongs
of the standard are remarkably focused on state action or inaction, which is
consistent with the due diligence principle and the Lenahan
recommendations. However, as this four-prong test has developed in New
York case law, the courts have increasingly relied on juries to determine
the question of whether the victim reasonably relied on the representations
of police.155 This troubling shift from an analysis of state responsibility to
that of the reasonable victim illustrates both the promise and the challenges
of domesticating Lenahan through municipal tort.
1. Development of the "ReasonableVictim" Test in New York
New York courts have consistently reinforced the primacy of the OP in
establishing liability for failed enforcement.1 5 6 "[A] duly issued order of
protection constitutes an 'assumption' of an 'affirmative duty' of protection
coupled with an awareness that 'inaction could lead to harm.'"' 57 As early
as 1966, prior to the major opinions that would give rise to more effective
police OP enforcement policies, the Appellate Division found that orders of
protection were intended to prevent violence against the persons protected
by the order. 58 A decade later, the Bruno decision and its corresponding
settlement assigned additional OP enforcement responsibilities to the New
York police, including, to: (a) respond swiftly and arrest the husband when
there is reasonable cause to believe an OP has been violated; and (b)
remain at the scene in order to terminate or prevent further offense.' 59
Municipal tort liability cases post-Bruno both expanded and narrowed
the doctrine. While some cases stressed the centrality of the OP in the
threshold analysis of whether a special relationship existed,16 0 others
narrowed the availability of recovery based on whether the victim had
154. Cuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 260 (1987).
155. See, e.g., Sorichetti v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 461, 471 (1985).
156. Id. at 469-70 ("The order evinces a preincident legislative and judicial
determination that its holder should be accorded a reasonable degree of protection from
a particular individual. It is presumptive evidence that the individual whose conduct is
proscribed has already been found by a court to be a dangerous or violent person and
that violations of the order's terms should be treated seriously.").
157. Mastroianni v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 91 N.Y.2d 198, 204 (1997) (quoting Cuffy, 69
N.Y.2d at 260).
158. Baker v. City of New York, 25 A.D.2d 770, 771-72 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966)
("The order of protection, though a relatively new invention in the law ... was
intended both as a remedial and preventive arm of the former Domestic Relations
Court . . . . Plaintiff was thus singled out by judicial process as a person in need of
special protection and peace officers had a duty to supply protection to her.").
159. Bruno v. Codd, 393 N.E.2d 976, 980 (N.Y. 1979).
160. Sorichetti, 65 N.Y.2d at 469.
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direct contact with the police and the relationship between the person
protected by the OP and the injured party.161 In the last twenty-five years,
the reliance element became "critical in establishing the existence of a
'special relationship' . . . provid[ing] the essential causative link between
16 2
the 'special duty' assumed by the municipality and the alleged injury.',
Cases that followed regularly deemed any actions by the victim evidencing
that they were "lulled. . . into a false sense of security"l 6 3 by the police as
de facto justifiable reliance or at most, a question to be determined by a
64
jury.1
2. The "Reasonable Victim" Examined in New York's Highest Court
While historically the New York courts have left the question of the
reasonableness of the victim's reliance to a jury, the most recent case from
the state's highest court took the unusual step of making this determination
itself. In the summer of 2011, the New York Court of Appeals excused the
City of New York from liability for the failed enforcement of an OP that
resulted in the shooting of a woman by her boyfriend in the presence of her
two five-year-old twin sons in Valdez v. City of New York.'65 Despite over
fifty years of New York jurisprudence that would have provided a
foundation for assigning liability to the state and deference to the jury on
the reasonable victim question,' 66 the Valdez court instead found that the
claimant had unjustifiably relied on an officer's promise that the abuser in
violation of the order would be arrested "immediately" and barred her from

relief.167
The Appellate Division examined the victim's reasonableness not only in
161. Cufft, 69 N.Y.2d at 262.
162. Id. at 261.
163. Id.

164. Raucci v. Town of Rotterdam, 902 F.2d 1050, 1058 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding
that "failure of [the victim] to change her routine was a true indicator of her reliance on
a perceived promise of police protection"); Mastroianni v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 91 N.Y. 2d
198, 205 (1997) (concluding that officers' representations that they "would do
whatever they could" paired with additional affirmative undertakings including waiting
in front of the residence and observing victim moving furniture back into her house
rendered her reliance justifiable); Tamaras v. Cnty. of Nassau, 264 A.D.2d 390, 391
(N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (finding that whether or not plaintiffs reasonably relied on
representations that abuser would be arrested constitutes a triable question of fact);
Zwart v. Town of Wallkill, 192 A.D.2d 831, 834 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (using
evidence that victim did not alter her regular routine as support for the reasonable
inference that she relied upon defendants' representations of protection and gave rise to
a triable issue of fact); Berliner v. Thompson, 166 A.D.2d 78, 82 (N.Y. App. Div.
1991) (noting that whether defendant altered her daily routine in reliance on police
promises gives rise to a triable issue of fact).
165. Valdez v. City of New York (Valdez II), 18 N.Y.3d 69, 85 (2011).
166. See discussion infra.
167. Valdez II, 18 N.Y.3d at 74.
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light of police practice, but also their own, stating that "[i]n the few cases
where courts have found justifiable reliance . .. a verbal assurance
invariably has been followed by visible police protection of the
plaintiff." 68 Effectively, the court justified its position that the victim
acted unreasonably, not by examining the victim's actions, but by
minimizing verbal assurances made by police absent further action taken
by the police.
The oral arguments in the case took place shortly after the issuance of
the Commission's opinion in Lenahan.16 9 Despite this timely coincidence
and despite the fact that the amicus brief asserted a compelling
international human rights law argument, none of the lawyers in the case
focused on due diligence, much less the Commission's ruling and
recommendations.17 0 This was a missed opportunity for the claimants to
test the persuasiveness of the theory and language defining the international
due diligence standard in a domestic forum. Admittedly, the court would
not likely have been receptive to overt international law references. But
had the petitioners engaged the court in a dialogue about a state-centered
theory of liability, focusing on the first three prongs of the New York
special relationship test, rather than allowing the court's focus to shift to
the reasonableness of the victim, the outcome may have been different.
In crafting the majority opinion, Justice Graffeo seized upon key
language in the dissent in a 1966 case on point, rearticulating that "the
government is not an insurer against harm suffered by its citizenry at the
hands of third parties." 1 7' This reasoning is reflective of the Supreme
Court's analysis in DeShaney and Castle Rock, erring on the side of
shielding law enforcement from lawsuits rather than assigning state
responsibility for certain private harms. Although it could be viewed as an
articulation of a generalizable "reasonable victim" standard, the opinion
was so narrowly tailored to the facts of the case that it may compellingly be
argued as an anomaly when viewed within the context of the larger body of

168. Valdez v. City of New York (Valdez 1), 74 A.D.3d 76, 80 (N.Y. App. Div.
2010).
169. The oral arguments in Valdez II took place before the New York Court of
Appeals on September 7, 2011. The Lenahan decision was issued less than two
months prior, on July 21, 2011.
170. The oral arguments in this case are archived on the Court of Appeals website at
No. 153, http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/arguments/2011/Sepll/Sepl1 OA.htm (last
visited July 1, 2012); see also Brief for N.Y.C. Bar Assoc. et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellants, Valdez v. City of New York, 18 N.Y. 3d 69 (2011) (No. 20110153), 2011 WL 5920358.
171. Valdez II, 18 N.Y.3d at 75; Baker v. City of New York, 25 A.D.2d 770, 773
(N.Y. A pp. Div. 1966) ("[T]here is nothing in the statute which created such remedy
that made any particular peace officer or the municipality which he served the insurer
of the safety of the person for whose benefit such an order was issued.").
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jurisprudence.17 2
E. Weaving Due Diligence into the Fabricof MunicipalLiability as a
LitigationStrategy to Eliminate the "Reasonable Victim" Analysis
As the preceding analysis illustrates, municipal tort liability may offer
some advantages over federal legislative efforts to address government
failure to enforce orders of protection. The strategy for victim advocates
and litigators alike is to begin to use the due diligence framework of
foreseeability and prevention to advance the argument in favor of state
liability, focusing on the inadequacy of the state's enforcement rather than
permitting the analysis to shift to the reasonableness of the victim's
reliance. Using the reasoning set forth in Lenahan and referencing the
international due diligence standard in the pleadings for domestic OP
enforcement liability cases may help reframe the issue as one of human
rights rather than human instinct.
It is clear that international human rights law aims to hold the nationstate accountable for failed OP enforcement. Domestically, states that
create a special relationship duty but shift the burden to the victim to prove
her actions were reasonable essentially hold the victim accountable for the
failed enforcement. In doing so, the state mimics the dysfunction of an
abusive relationship: the state holds much of the power and control in the
issuance and enforcement of an OP, but rather than accepting responsibility
when it fails its duty, it places the onus on the victim to prove that she was
not at fault. This is akin to an abuser blaming the victim for the abuse he
inflicts upon her.
172. The essential facts of the case are helpful in distinguishing it from others of

precedential value. The plaintiff obtained a second order of protection against her
former boyfriend. Valdez II, 18 N.Y.3d at 72. A week later, her boyfriend threatened
to kill her and she reported the threat to the Domestic Violence Unit of the police
whereupon an officer told her that the boyfriend would be arrested "immediately." Id.
The following evening, she stepped from her apartment into the hallway to take out the
trash and her boyfriend shot her several times in front of her two children. Id. at 73.
He then turned the gun on himself and committed suicide. Id. The Court distinguished
these facts from those in Mastroiannion several bases: (1) plaintiff could not have
reasonably relied on the police promise to arrest her boyfriend "immediately" in the
literal sense, "since his location had to be discovered"; (2) based on her prior
experience with the police, plaintiff should have expected that police would call once
they arrested him and therefore she was not justified in relaxing her vigilance (by
taking the trash outside her door into the hallway of her apartment building); (3) the
police did not do anything more than promise to arrest him "immediately" and it is not
"always justifiable for a citizen to rely on an assertion made by a police officer." Id. at
82-83. Advancing the logic of the Court, more reasonable behavior on the part of the
plaintiff would have been to: (1) discount the representations of the police officer; and
(2) consider any step from the threshold of her apartment door as a relaxation of
vigilance. A reasonable OP holder in New York under this analysis remains in her
dwelling indefinitely, calling the police for confirmation of arrest before so much as
opening her front door, and viewing skeptically the representations made by police all
the while.
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In the alternative, shifting the focus from the reasonableness of the
actions that the victim took in reliance on the police and redirecting the
focus to the foreseeable risks created by failed OP enforcement policies
may prove to be an effective litigation strategy post-Lenahan. Rather than
perpetuating the theoretical connection between the actions taken by the
victim and proximate cause, the framework more reflective of the due
diligence standard and established municipal tort liability standards focuses
on the foreseeable risks created by the municipality when the municipality
affirmatively assumes a duty to protect the victim, but then fails to take
reasonable measures to prevent the harm. This is the most powerful
potential of refraining OP enforcement liability in terms of due diligence
within the domestic framework of municipal tort: the reasonableness of the
victim's reliance is viewed within the context of the foreseeable risks faced
by the victim as a result of the (in)adequacy of state preventative measures,
rather than the reasonableness of her reliance on those same flawed
measures in the absence of an alternative. This slight shift in the analysis
does not require courts to remove or strike down the reliance prong, but
rather to shift the focus off the victim's behavior and on to the state's.
Litigants are not precluded from alleging violations of the American
Convention and the due diligence principle in their domestic municipal
liability pleadings. The Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School is
engaged in a number of projects to provide technical assistance to
individuals seeking to incorporate human rights arguments in domestic
pleadings.173 Admittedly, there is a risk of immediately alienating the
adjudicator by infusing routine civil proceedings with international law, but
if it is done in a manner that does not insist on international law as
precedent, but rather, informs the adjudicator's analysis of existing local
law through the lens of international human rights norms, the potential
positive outcome may outweigh the risk.
Additionally, attorneys representing victims in civil tort liability cases
should use the language of due diligence in their oral and written legal
arguments. At worst, it is ignored as irrelevant, non-binding rhetoric. At
best, the courts make note of the arguments and afford them treatment in
published opinions, providing litigants with a basis for further appeals and
developing a body of jurisprudence that acknowledges the arguments as
legitimate, if not persuasive. The goal is to shift the focus of courts and
juries off of the victim's actions in reliance and back on to the state's
failure to address foreseeable risks. Through this next frontier of tort
litigation, victim advocates can develop norms that contradict the
173. See The Bringing Human Rights Home Lawyers' Network, COLUM. L. SCH.,
http://www.law.columbia.edu/human-rights-institute/initiatives/us (last visited July 1,
2012).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol21/iss2/3

42

Rogerson: Domesticating Due Diligence: Municipal Tort Litigation's Potentia
2012]

DOMESTICATING DUE DILIGENCE

331

prevailing viewpoint limiting government liability for harm to
individuals. 174
In addition to conceptual advantages in shifting the legal analysis from
the behavior of the victim to that of the state, the tort approach offers even
more pragmatic advantages. First, tort claims carry with them the
possibility of a monetary judgment as a tangible, rather than symbolic,
remedy for the claimant and her family. Second, although the Castle
Rock/DeShaney line of cases eliminated any federal Constitutional claims
to protection, municipal tort liability suits informed by international law
principles and filed in municipal courts provide a path for victims to seek
meaningful enforcement of OPs.
CONCLUSION

Enforcement is said to be the "Achilles' heel" of the OP process because
"an order without enforcement at best offers scant protection and at worst
increases the victim's danger by creating a false sense of security.
Offenders may routinely violate orders, if they believe there is no real risk
of being arrested."' 75 The laws giving rise to orders of protection, the
decisions of the courts in issuing them, and police policies regarding
enforcement will consistently fail to achieve their intended aim unless
those entrusted with the execution of the law are both given the tools to do
so and held accountable when they do not.
As Jessica Lenahan's primary appellate attorney, Caroline BettingerLopez, so aptly noted, the Commission's decision in Lenahan provides an
opportunity and a tool for government decision makers, domestic violence
victim advocates, and other stakeholders to effectuate systemic change in
the institutions responsible for OP enforcement.1 76 The decision can be
used for building coalitions and movements toward increased state
responsibility, the normative development of civil rights law to better
174. "[T]ort law is essentially a normative enterprise that both reflects and

influences broader moral conflicts in society." Lytton, supra note 124, at 472. "Each of
the different powers of the State has a role to play in changing patriarchal values. For
example, the judiciary and prosecutors working on cases of domestic violence have the
potential and the obligation, to change the prevailing balance of power by taking a
strong stance to disempower patriarchal notions. Interventions at this level may have
both consequential and intrinsic effects in that prosecutors or judges can be considered
to be the 'mouthpieces' of society, and strong statements condemning violence against
women made on behalf of society through the judiciary or prosecutorial services will
make that society less patriarchal." Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women,

Its Causes and Consequences, Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the
Gender Perspective: Violence Against Women, Comm'n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2006/61 90 (Jan. 20, 2006) (by Yakin Ertitrk).
175. FiNN & COLSON, supra note 78, at 49.
176. Caroline Bettinger-Lopez, Jessica Gonzales v. United States: An Emerging
Model for Domestic Violence & Human Rights Advocacy in the United States, 21
HARV. HUM. RTs J. 183, 192-93 (2008).
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incorporate international human rights standards, exerting political pressure
and influencing public opinion. 177 The complex and varied standards of
state responsibility in the American federalist governance structure and the
United States' practice of noncompliance with the Commission's rulings
requires a multifaceted approach to domesticating the due diligence
principles articulated in Lenahan.
One promising approach may be through litigation based on a theory of
municipal tort liability targeting the practices and policies of municipalities
that consistently fail to properly enforce OPs. Creative litigants currently
seeking redress from the United States can use the principles articulated in
the Lenahan decision to compose novel municipal tort liability arguments
focusing on foreseeability and prevention efforts by the state, viewing the
reasonableness of the victim's reliance in the context of the foreseeable
risks created by the inadequacy of the state's response, rather than focusing
on the reasonableness of the actions that the victim took in reliance.
Informing municipal tort liability arguments with international human
rights theory may prove to be a promising, effective, grassroots,
motivational tool in the creation of and adherence to effective OP
enforcement policies and practices.17

177. Id. at 190.
178. "Theories thus become instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we can
rest. We don't lie back upon them, we move forward, and, on occasion, make nature
over again by their aid." WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEw NAME FOR SOME OLD
WAYS OF THINKING 53 (Longman's, Green & Co. 1907).
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